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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 The livestock sector in the IGAD region 
 
Livestock play important roles in both national economies and households’ livelihoods in the IGAD 
region. Excluding Somalia, livestock account for around 15% of the gross domestic product (GDP) of 
IGAD member countries. The IGAD region supports an estimated 68 million livestock units, with 
Ethiopia having the highest livestock populations in Africa. Livestock products constitute an 
important category of exports in the region: for example, in Somalia in abundant rainfall years, 
livestock can account for up to 80% of total exports. In Ethiopia, livestock skins and hides are the 
second most important export commodity after coffee. It is estimated that there are 43 million 
poor livestock keepers in the region, estimated to account for 60% of the total poor. 
 
Livestock-based livelihoods in the IGAD region have recently been reviewed by Sandford and Ashley 
(2008). They categorized the region’s livestock-dependent livelihoods into four categories: 
 
• pastoral area 
• mixed farming 
• large-scale livestock enterprises 
• urban and landless 
 
The study focused on pastoral areas. Pastoral livelihoods were further subdivided into pastoral, 
agro-pastoral and pastoral drop-outs. Pastoral livelihoods were characterized as being highly 
dependent on livestock, including sheep, goats, cattle, camels and donkeys. In recent decades it 
was noted that both sources of food and income had diversified: in the past, milk constituted a 
major component of diets but now high-value livestock and livestock products were sold to enable 
grain to be purchased. Diversified income sources now included trading, sales of wood, charcoal, 
palm leaf products, gums and resins, and often also sales of labour. Pastoralists utilize a number of 
traditional coping strategies to help them cope with shocks, especially the droughts which are a 
pervasive feature of the semi-arid and arid areas in which they live. These strategies include 
mobility, whereby herds are trekked to access browse, grazing and water resources; herd 
accumulation, which recognizes that owning large herds ahead of a drought will help ensure that a 
viable sized herd survives after the drought; and livestock sharing and loan arrangements, whereby 
pastoralists loan each other animals to enable faster post-drought recovery, and also share animals 
between each others’ herds, thereby spreading the risk amongst more herds. 
 
Agro-pastoral livelihoods in the region include both those who have traditionally combined crop 
production with extensive rearing of livestock as well as those who have been ‘forced’ to grow 
crops because they can no longer rely entirely on their livestock. As for pastoralists, livestock play 
an important role in coping strategies, especially in relation to drought, although crops can also 
play a role in drought recovery - in some cases enabling a return to full pastoralism. In addition to 
providing food and income, agro-pastoralists often also use cattle and camels for ploughing. 
 
Pastoral drop-outs are often female-headed households who have lost their herds and now have 
very few productive assets except their labour. They tend to move to urban areas where they may 
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be able to sell their labour and access food aid, although their incomes are very low and unreliable. 
Although some still have a few goats, sheep or in some cases poultry, they are unlikely to ever 
return to a pastoralism: neither customary nor external restocking initiatives are usually sufficient 
to enable them to be rehabilitated to viable livelihoods dependent on livestock. Frequent drought 
is making it increasingly difficult for pastoralists to rebuild their herds and flocks in the decreasing 
inter-drought interval, which is likely to create more and more pastoral drop-outs. 
 
1.2 Nature of innovation response capacity and the building of policy- 
      relevant innovation capacity in the context of livestock-related  
      emergencies in East Africa 
 
The study explored the nature of innovation response capacity and the building of policy-relevant 
innovation capacity in the context of livestock-related emergencies in East Africa.  
 
The work described has been carried out on behalf of the Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development’s Livestock Policy Initiative (IGAD-LPI), a regional sister initiative to the FAO’s Pro-
poor Livestock Policy Initiative (PPLPI). IGAD and FAO have formed a partnership with the objective 
of enhancing the contribution of livestock to sustainable food security and poverty reduction in the 
region through the strengthening of policy formulation and implementation capacity of relevant 
organizations and stakeholders, including IGAD and its member state governments. 
 
Through two case studies, the report describes innovation response capacity in relation to 
livestock-related emergencies in East Africa using the examples of a recent regional drought and 
the zoonotic disease Rift Valley fever, situating these in on-going conceptual and policy debates. 
The case studies are described and then analysed using an analytical framework that considers, 
actors and their roles, patterns of interaction, habits and practices, and presence or absence of an 
enabling environment. As part of this study, policy-relevant innovation capacity was explored 
during two workshops which brought together livestock sector policy makers from Djibouti, 
Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, together with representatives of international 
organizations and NGOs, to focus on process monitoring, policy dialogue and the sharing of 
experiences. The report reveals a set of policy relevant lessons and indicative practices for policy 
makers and practitioners on building innovation response capacity in the IGAD region. 
 
1.3 The innovation systems concept 
 
The idea of an innovation system is now widely used to explore innovation processes and capacities 
at both national and sectoral levels (Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1995; Malerba 2002) in both the 
developed and increasingly developing economies (Hall et al 2002; World Bank 2006).  
 
At its simplest, the concept departs from earlier notions of innovation as a research-driven process 
of technology transfer. Instead it views innovation as a social process where different sources of 
knowledge and ideas are put into use. The concept gives centre stage to two interconnected 
dimension of the innovation process. 
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The first is the interaction of different players in economic systems; the roles they play and the 
way their interaction facilitates the transmission, adaptation and use of ideas, and enables learning 
and innovation.  
 
The second dimension is the way this process is located in, shaped by and responds to various 
contexts: the habits and practices – institutions - of the various actors involved in innovation; the 
historical, cultural and political setting that shape habits, practice and styles of innovation; and the 
enabling environment that includes some of these other contextual elements, but also includes 
policies and infrastructure as well as the market itself as a mechanism for providing incentives for 
entrepreneurial activity.  
 
Two other important considerations that the innovation systems framework allows one to reveal are 
the dynamics of the processes involved and the capacities that emerge at a systems level. So, while 
the concept recognises the importance of certain types of relationships and linkage that mediate 
information flows, it also recognises that in ever changing environments (markets, policy, 
technology, climate), patterns of linkages need to change to meet new conditions and demands.  
 
The recognition of this as a systems phenomenon is arguably the critical point of departure for 
contemporary thinking on innovation. Not only does it recognise the interaction of many individual 
parts, and the non-linearity of the outcomes of these interactions, but also that these networks of 
interacting elements have emergent properties. That is to say, these systems have properties which 
are more than the sum of the constituent parts, which cannot be accounted for by analysis of 
individual elements of the system. It is for this reason that institutional settings of actors - ways of 
working – assume such significance as this is in a sense the ‘hidden hand’ that determines how the 
system operates. By the same reasoning it is why science, technology and innovation policy focus is 
shifting towards considering capacity development in terms of the behaviour of systems rather than 
in terms of quantum of research or the nature of technology transfer elements. 
 
Innovation capacity in highly dynamic environments 
 
The focus of this document is the responsiveness of parts of the livestock sector in East Africa to 
changing contexts and, in particular, responses to rapidly changing conditions, caused by drought 
and the disease Rift Valley fever (RVF). For natural resources based industries, such as livestock in 
developing countries, this has become a particularly important concern. In a sector where rapid 
(and often unpredictable) change in market, technological, social and environmental circumstances 
calls the tune, more thought needs to be given to the kind of capacity that needs to be developed 
to be able to respond to the frequent and often unpredictable changes - without compromising the 
contribution that livestock can make to sustainable and inclusive growth. The ever increasing rate 
of change in the sector’s markets means that responsiveness is likely to be the critical element of 
innovation capacity.  
 
The idea of innovation response capacity is not really well defined in the literature. It would seem, 
however, that its broad contours would be very similar to what is generally discussed as innovation 
capacity, as has been outlined above, but with specific analytical attention given to two aspect. 
First are the factors, arrangements and attributes that enable rapid response; factors that allow 
timely responses in a rapidly changing environment are going to be crucial. This implies that the 
response capacity must include both mechanisms for early warning of up-coming changes, as well 
as mechanisms for dealing with the opportunities and challenges that arise from these. 
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The second aspect that needs attention is the specificity of the response. That is to say the 
response has to be tailored to the specific characteristics of the opportunity or challenge as well as 
the context of the response: for example, it is no good having a general capacity to respond to 
changing consumer demands if the demand is for organic produce - the capacity to innovate must 
be specific. Similarly, while a country with a strong analytical science base and effectively 
enforced food standards may be able to respond in certain ways, a country without these 
competencies and skills would need to respond to consumer demands differently - for example, 
with external assistance.  
 
Analytical elements for exploring innovation response capacity 
 
What then might be the specific analytical elements that could be used to explore innovation 
response capacity? A useful starting point is to follow the four-point analytical framework 
developed by the World Bank to investigate agricultural innovation capacity (World Bank 2006). 
These four elements are: 
 
• Actors and their roles 
• Patterns of interaction 
• Habits and practices 
• Enabling environment. 
 
Actors and their roles. Innovation systems’ principles tell us that the process of innovation 
requires a diversity of actors, which might include entrepreneurs, research and training 
organisations, public policy bodies and civil society organisations. In terms of responsiveness, it is 
not possible to be prescriptive about which actors should be present. However the following roles 
are expected to be important: 
 
• Sector coordination: This is important as it provides coherence to actions of the different 
actors in the sector. Not only does this facilitate the patterns of interaction needed for 
innovation, it also helps coordinate and speed the actions needed to respond. This response 
might be new groupings of actors, dissemination of new information or the introduction of 
new practices. Sometimes, coordination might be more concerned with third party 
brokerage rather than sector-wide coordination. 
 
• Entrepreneurship: This role is important because it is by grasping opportunities and taking 
risks that sectors innovate in response to changing market opportunities. If this role is not 
well developed, responses to opportunities will be weak. While this seems obvious, 
entrepreneurship is not uniformly developed across all sectors and countries. Although this 
role could, in theory, be played by either the public or private sectors, the private sector is 
now usually thought to be better suited to this role. Again, this can vary from country to 
country and sector to sector. 
 
• Providing knowledge of the future: This role is important in response capacity as it is the 
way in which early warning information about up-coming challenges and opportunities is 
collected and transmitted to entrepreneurs and policy makers. Buyers and others in market 
chains, for example, might play this role in relation to information about changing market 
demands and policy and regulatory changes in distant markets. Informal networks linking 
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sectors to policy makers, meanwhile, might give early warning on up-coming policy 
changes. Farmers’ organisations and industry association might also play this role. Some 
countries might have formal foresight committees or standing panels on certain export 
commodities with the specific purpose of collating expert opinions on future market or 
technology conditions. 
 
• Research: Not all innovation requires formal research; by the same logic neither does 
responsiveness. Nevertheless, research plays an important role in the innovation process as 
a specialist form of knowledge creation: it both addresses unforeseen challenges and 
opportunities and provides opportunities through new technology. Both private and public 
organisations can play a research role, but in many developing countries the public sector is 
dominant. This role is often closely connected to tertiary education.  
 
• Service provision: There are a number of services which are required for innovation and 
which contribute to responsiveness, including technical advisory, financial and auditing 
services to help with regulatory compliance. 
 
• Ensuring socially desirable outcomes: Ensuring socially desirable outcomes is no longer a 
non-market issue. As global consumers become more sensitive to the social and ethical 
consequences of the good and services they purchase, non-regulator policing and assistance 
with compliance to these standards is an important role in responding to the ever-more 
sophisticated demands of the market. The advocacy role of organisations is also important 
in this context; for example alerting society to malpractices and social inequity. It is 
usually civil society organisations that play this role, but the public and even the private 
sectors may also do so in certain sectors and countries.  
 
Patterns of interaction. Again it is dangerous to be too prescriptive of the sorts of patterns of 
interaction that should be present in innovation response capacity. Indeed, the innovation systems 
concept tells us that patterns of interaction will be shaped by the local context and the particular 
innovation challenges or opportunity that are being addressed. These patterns are dynamic and will 
change over time, in response to changing patterns of challenges and opportunities. What one 
would expect to see is evidence of a loose network of linkages between actors in the sector that 
provides coherence and which acts as a foundation for more concrete forms of linkage and 
collaboration in times of need. This informal cohesiveness is often discussed in the innovation 
literature in terms of social capital (Fukuda-Parr, Lopes and Malik 2002). In analysing patterns of 
interaction it is important to bear in mind that forms of interactions that allow two-way flows of 
information are the most important. Also, while frequency of interaction is an important 
consideration, quality of interaction is equally important. Critical aspects of patterns of interaction 
specifically relevant to innovation responsiveness include: 
 
• Links to consumers: Consumers provide critical information about preferences and how 
these are changing. Often, especially in the case of export markets, interaction with buyers 
(middlemen) is a critical source of information on consumer preferences in distant markets. 
Trade fairs can facilitate a similar form of interaction. 
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• Links to specialist technical knowledge: Changing market and policy conditions often 
involve the need for technical upgrading. This might be in terms of production and process 
technology, production organisation, packaging or marketing. This might require linkages to 
research organisations in cases where problems and opportunities require new knowledge. 
More often, however, it will involve linkages to technical services and/or organizations 
which can help adapt existing technologies and processes to a new situation. 
 
• Mechanisms that facilitate interaction: Sector coordination bodies, such as government 
agencies and industry associations exist in some sectors to help foster interaction between 
different actors. Since innovation response capacity often involves rapid reconfiguration of 
patterns of interaction, mechanisms that facilitate this are likely to be important. One such 
mechanism is to have a high degree of organization in the sector, i.e. farmers associations, 
women’s associations, self-help groups, industry associations, export associations and 
cooperatives.  
 
Habits and practices. Habits and practices, or institutions, are the most intangible element of 
innovation capacity, but also the most important. They are the mainly informal rules that 
determine how people behave and shape the way they do things. The innovation systems concept 
gives particular attention to the institutions that affect the processes of interaction, information 
sharing and learning. In relation to innovation response capacity there are a number of basic ways 
of working that are likely to be important. These are some of the institutions that underpin them: 
 
• Attitudes towards change: Most people tend to be conservative by nature and fear and 
avoid change. Public and private sectors organizations exhibit varying degrees of reluctance 
to change. This is most marked in public sector organisations because of the rigid rules and 
hierarchies that often characterize these organizations. Although these same 
characteristics can sometimes also be seen in the private sector, because this attitude 
seriously undermines their ability to respond to markets and competition, these type of 
organization do not remain in business long. 
 
• Trust: Trust is an important lubricant in social relationship. Since innovation is a social 
process of interaction, information sharing and learning, trust is a necessary ingredient in 
the relationships needed to underpin innovation. By the same argument responsiveness to 
rapidly changing circumstances requires a sufficient degree of trust among actors in a 
sector to ease the creation of the new relationships needed for innovation. Trust often 
manifests its self as willingness to cooperate with other actors.  
     
• Shared identity: Another institution that can help coherence, and thus aid responsiveness, 
is the degree of shared identity or the sense of ‘belonging’ that exists among actors in a 
sector. This is importance for a number of reasons: Increasingly, and particularly for export 
sectors, competitive pressures come from other countries rather than domestic 
competitors. Responding to this type of competition requires collaboration and the 
recognition that survival of the sector is a collective responsibility. An example is the need 
to respond to quality demands in distant markets: often this is about building a sector’s 
reputation for quality and this requires all actors to recognise this as a shared 
responsibility. The ‘we are us’ mentality is therefore an important aspect of innovation 
response capacity. 
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• Learningness: The innovation systems concept gives very strong emphasis to learning and 
the habits and relationship that enable this process. These are often difficult to distinguish 
and may best be revealed by identifying the way practices and behaviour of actors or 
sectors have changed as a result of learning from experience, research, interaction or 
searching for information. Attitudes that support this include a propensity for 
experimentation, risk taking and organizational ‘space’ for trying new things out. Some 
organizations may have structured learning practices as part of their management strategy, 
or they may utilise external evaluation. Since much learning accumulates in the form of 
tacit knowledge, organizations with low staff turn-over may be better placed to learn and 
build capacity in the longer term. Learning is particularly important in relation to response 
capacity as, in dynamic environments, the ability to learn how to cope with a continuous 
succession of largely unpredictable events is an essential attribute for success.  
 
• National culture: The originators of the innovations concept rightly point out that there 
are different national styles of innovation and that they emerge from cultural, historical 
and political contexts at a national level (Lundvall 1992; Freeman 1995). National culture is 
an emotive subject and one needs to be careful not to fall into the trap of dismissing 
certain national cultural traits as constraints to innovation and innovation responsiveness. 
But national cultures also evolve; certain cultural stereotypes can become quickly 
outdated. Nevertheless, attributes like the degree of social cohesiveness, or the degree of 
social hierarchies found in society as a whole, can reflect on innovation responsiveness. 
Similarly, accepted views on the role of certain actors in society, particularly the public 
and private sectors, can similarly be reflected in capacity. Analytically, this allows a more 
nuanced diagnosis of existing patterns of capacity; from an intervention perspective this 
provides the contextual backdrop for the design of capacity strengthening activities.  
 
Enabling environment. The enabling environment is the wider set of policies and institutions in 
which the innovation process is situated. Much of the enabling environment manifests itself through 
the factors already discussed. For example, agricultural science and technology policy often 
determine the degree of interaction between researchers and actors in the productive sector. More 
specific factors might include monetary policy, infrastructure, level of corruption, the 
effectiveness of the legal system, education practices, regulatory regimes and sector governance 
amongst others. A final aspect of the enabling environment is the presence of a strong market or, 
in its absence, policy triggers that provide the incentives for innovation. 
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2. THE CASE STUDIES 
 
2.1 Selection of Case Studies 
 
In 2007/08, IGAD-LPI organized extensive stakeholder meetings in the IGAD member countries to 
identify livestock policy priority areas. They also subsequently facilitated the establishment of 
policy hubs to support efforts towards the harmonization of a regional animal health policy 
framework and to intensify policy engagement for the improved incorporation of livestock sector 
concerns in national poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSP) processes. This research study, which 
explores innovation response capacity in relation to livestock emergencies, is designed to inform 
both the policy hubs as well as the broader group of stakeholders, with the objective of assisting 
them in their endeavours to promote pro-poor policy change in the region’s livestock sector. 
 
The choice of case studies for inclusion in this study emerged from national stakeholder meetings 
facilitated by IGAD-LPI in 2006/07. A key objective of these meetings was to identify priority 
livestock policy areas. Two such areas that emerged from this process were recent regional 
droughts and the 2006/07 RVF outbreak as relevant scenarios to examine response capacities. To 
compare livestock emergency responses across countries the RVF case study focuses on Kenya and 
Ethiopia. 
 
2.2 Case Study One: The 2006/07 Rift Valley Fever Outbreak in East 
       Africa and the Horn 
 
2.2.1 The Kenyan experience 
 
• Introduction 
 
North-east Kenya is a semi-arid region inhabited mainly by ethnically Somali pastoralists. The 
region is remote with poor infrastructure and communication links, and has low levels of public 
services. The security situation is hazardous; violent cross-border cattle raiding incidents and 
bloody disputes over scarce grazing and water resources, exacerbated by the ready availability of 
automatic weapons from neighbouring Somalia, are not uncommon.  
The region has erratic and unreliable rainfall: in early 2006 the Kenya Government declared the 
drought a national disaster – reports indicated that in north-eastern Kenya three-quarters of 
livestock had died and two-thirds of the population were reliant on food aid for their survival; in 
late 2006 the three-year long drought gave way to a prolonged period of heavy rainfall and 
widespread and persistent flooding.  
 
Pastoralists’ livelihoods in the region depend on the extensive rearing of sheep, goats, cattle, 
camels and donkeys. These animals are subject to large-scale die-offs due to droughts, and in 
recent decades the increased frequency of extreme weather events has caused traditional coping 
mechanisms, such as building up herd and flock numbers during the good years, to fail.  Livestock 
are also at risk from various diseases including: in cattle, lumpy skin disease, foot-and-mouth 
disease and contagious bovine pleuropneumonia (CBPP); in sheep and goats, peste des petits 
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ruminants (PPR), sheep and goat pox, contagious caprine pleuropneumonia (CCPP) and foot-rot 
during floods; in camels, Surra and a number of as yet uncharacterized diseases; and for all these 
species Rift Valley fever.  
 
• The 2006/07 RVF outbreak 
 
In early October 2006, Somali pastoralists in Sangailo, a small village in Ijara District, North Eastern 
Province, Kenya first noticed worrying symptoms in their livestock: abortion occurring at more than 
four-times the rate during years when no drought or major disease epidemic occurs - (more than 8 
out of every 10 pregnant sheep and goats aborted), animals with bloody noses which were also 
frothing at the mouth, and a very high mortality rate amongst lambs and kids. Coming shortly after 
a period of heavy and persistent rain and widespread flooding, and coinciding with the presence of 
swarms of a rarely-seen, large, black and white mosquito they knew this was bad news – it was 
undoubtedly the disease known locally as sandik or abbur and more widely as Rift Valley fever 
(RVF).  
 
 
What is Rift Valley fever? 
Rift Valley fever is a viral disease that affects sheep, goats, cattle and camels as well as people. 
The epidemiology of the disease varies: in forested zones of Africa it tends to be endemic, 
occurring after the onset of the rainy season; in high rainfall grassland areas it occurs epidemically 
in 5 to 15 year cycles; in the semi-arid zones of the Greater Horn of Africa – with which this case 
study is concerned – it occurs as epidemics in years in which heavy rainfall leads to flooding with 
surface water persisting for at least four weeks. This provides ideal conditions for mosquito eggs, 
which have lain dormant in the soil since the previous flood, to hatch. The RVF virus can survive in 
the eggs of certain species of Aedes mosquitoes for many years. Once hatched, the emerging adult 
female mosquitoes infect livestock with the virus as they feed on their blood. The floodwaters also 
provide ideal breeding conditions for a wide variety of other mosquito and midge species which act 
as secondary vectors, further transmitting the virus to susceptible livestock.  
 
Typically, herders, slaughterhouse workers, butchers and animal health workers are most affected 
by RVF. This suggests that infection in humans occurs mainly through direct contact with blood and 
tissues, such as aborted foetuses, of RVF-infected animals. In livestock, the disease mainly results 
in abortions and the death of young animals, especially of sheep and goats. In people, although the 
disease is usually mild and flu-like, in a minority of cases it can cause serious complications and 
even death. There is no effective treatment for RVF; affected patients (human or animal) can only 
be provided with supportive therapies and be treated for inter-current infections. Vaccines are 
commercially available for use in livestock, although the currently available ones are not ideal: for 
example, the vaccine used during outbreaks causes abortion in pregnant animals. Vaccination of 
animals in areas experiencing active infections is not recommended as the act of vaccination can 
further transmit the virus between animals via contaminated multi-use needles. No human vaccines 
are currently commercially available. In Kenya, RVF outbreaks have previously been recorded in 
1931, 1951/53, 1961/63, 1967/68, 1977/79, 1997/98 and most recently 2006/07. 
 
 
Around the same time, in other villages in Ijara and the neighbouring district of Garissa, pastoralists 
were observing similar symptoms. Many of these pastoralists remembered the previous occasion 
when they had witnessed similar symptoms and conditions: in 1997/98 an RVF outbreak had caused 
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major losses in their herds and flocks and resulted in the death of family and clan members. 
Initially, pastoralists and community-based animal health workers (CAHWs) tried to treat their 
animals using a combination of traditional and more modern (though inappropriate) methods. Only 
when these failed did the CAHWs report the disease to the local district veterinary officer on behalf 
of their communities. In some cases this was done via radio-calls provided by the local 
administration; in other cases the reports were simply passed through local chiefs or the police. 
Some villages were unable to report the disease outbreak because they were too remote and lacked 
communication infrastructure. 
 
District- and provincial-level veterinary officers reported that they were unable to mount an 
immediate investigation or response. Due to flooding, many of the roads were impassable and in 
addition they lacked sufficient serviceable vehicles, equipment and protective clothing, or 
adequate personnel and funds. It also appears that, initially, they assumed that the diagnosis by 
the pastoralists and CAHWs was wrong; that the probable cause of the disease was trypanosomiasis 
- which also causes abortion in livestock. 
 
Meanwhile, in the United States, scientists at the Department of Defence Global Emerging 
Infections System (GEIS) were compiling and publishing on the internet their regular monthly 
reports and maps of the relative risk of RVF. These are based on analysis and interpretation of 
satellite-derived observations of sea-surface temperatures, cloudiness, rainfall and vegetation 
dynamics. The data are collected daily by several satellites as part of the global climate observing 
efforts of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) and the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration and are associated with heavy rainfall. Their September 2006 report 
gave the impression that, overall, the RVF risk in East Africa was relatively low. Only in their 
October report did GEIS suggest that there was an elevated risk of an RVF outbreak in East Africa, 
including northern Kenya, and that “ground surveillance and response to disease outbreaks” was 
likely to be required during the next 2-6 months. This warning was picked up by the Emergency 
Prevention System for Transboundary Animal and Plant Pests and Diseases (EMPRES) of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) in Rome. A special issue of EMPRES Watch was published on their 
website and FAO and the World Health Organization (WHO) also sent warnings directly to the 
relevant national veterinary and public health authorities. However, this did not occur until 
November - more than a month after the pastoralists observed the first suspected cases in livestock 
and even after the first suspected cases in people started to emerge. 
 
As suspected cases of RVF in people started to be reported or present to health facilities in North 
Eastern Province in mid December, the Kenyan Government’s medical and veterinary authorities 
initiated their response, with the support of a wide range of partners from international 
organizations and NGOs. A major constraint to the government in mounting its response was the 
lack of an RVF contingency plan and the absence of emergency funding accessible to the veterinary 
department: Because the situation was not officially declared a national disaster1, this prevented 
the release of government emergency funding for a joint medical/veterinary response. These 
difficulties were to some extent overcome by the support and active participation of donors, 
international organizations and medical and veterinary NGOs.  
 
                                                            
1 To put this in context, the Kenya Government declared four national disasters due to drought or flood 
between 1993 and 2003. 
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In an early response, a helicopter was provided by the Ministry of Health (MoH) and dispatched to 
the flooded North Eastern Province. Specimens were collected from severely ill patients who were 
exhibiting haemorrhagic symptoms and sent to the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)-Kenya Medical 
Research Institute (KEMRI) laboratory in Nairobi in mid-December where they were confirmed 
positive for RVF. Immediately thereafter a task force, headed up by the district commissioner, was 
formed. The task force coordinated the interventions of the various agencies, including provincial 
and district medical and veterinary services, police, international organizations and NGOs. Several 
technical teams, each comprised of two state veterinary surgeons, five medical doctors and three 
NGO personnel, were formed in early January 2007 and sent to the affected areas to manage relief 
and emergency interventions, including the distribution of food.  
 
RVF is a World Organization for Animal Health (OIE) notifiable disease; the Kenya Director of 
Veterinary Services (DVS) formally reported the suspected outbreak to OIE on 4th December 2006.  
The diagnosis of RVF in samples collected from sick livestock was confirmed on the 22nd December.  
 
An early veterinary intervention was the closure of Garissa livestock market, the largest in north-
eastern Kenya, on the 17th December. This was followed by banning the slaughter and movement of 
livestock in the affected areas. The timing of these measures was delicate, coming as they did 
shortly before Eid-Ul-Adha, a religious festival marking the end of the Hajj, when the district’s 
predominantly Muslim population usually slaughter livestock. The Garissa District Chief Medical 
Officer estimated that more than 20,000 goats would usually be slaughtered in the district at this 
time. Urgent meetings were held with local religious leaders in an attempt to dissuade local 
residents from undertaking their customary home slaughter rites. 
 
Vaccination of livestock against RVF in at-risk but thus far uninfected areas started on the 8th 
January 2007. Livestock were also treated for other infections and administered with pour-on 
insecticide. Interventions led by the MoH included treating human cases and distributing mosquito 
nets and insecticide.  
 
The DVS and MoH also disseminated public health information: initially these were contradictory 
although later the two organizations’ messages were aligned. Local leaders, including religious 
leaders, played an important role in communicating key public health messages about RVF and 
debunking circulating rumours and conspiracy theories. For example, some local pastoralists 
believed that the disease control operations were a guise to reduce the size of their herds. Their 
suspicions were fanned by the timing of the interventions, which came shortly after the ousting of 
the Islamic Courts in neighbouring Somalia.  
 
Local radio stations were also utilized to broadcast public health messages, such as warning against 
drinking raw milk, slaughtering animals or eating uncertified meat. Subsequent surveys identified 
these as one of the most common sources of information for pastoralists. Kenyan mass media 
provided considerable coverage of the RVF outbreak. This was often critical of the government’s 
response, and was considered by some officials to be at times misleading and inaccurate, 
contributing to a degree of panic amongst the general public: The demand for red meat in Nairobi 
collapsed during the outbreak, although consumers were in fact at little or no risk. The outbreak 
resulted in the imposition of a ban on the importation of livestock from the entire Horn of Africa by 
trading partners in the Middle East. This ban had relatively little impact on Kenya, whose livestock 
and meat exports to this region is relatively small, but had much greater impact in Ethiopia (see 
Repercussions of the 2006/07 Horn of Africa Rift Valley fever outbreak in Ethiopia, below), and 
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even more in Somalia, where livelihoods and the national economy are highly dependent on the 
export of live animals to the Middle East. Whilst OIE’s guidelines do not require such a ban, their 
recommendations for importation of live animals or meat from countries with current or recent RVF 
outbreaks are so stringent that this is not an unreasonable response. 
 
Table 1: Sequence of events during the 2006/07 Kenya RVF outbreak 
Details of the sequence of events during the Kenyan RVF outbreak are presented in the following 
table: 
Date  Event 
2003-2006 Ongoing drought in northern and eastern Kenya 
August 2006 
Earliest recollection of heavy rainfall by pastoralists in North Eastern Province 
(NEP) 
September 2006  
Monthly GEIS report gave the impression that overall the risk in East Africa was 
relatively low 
Early October 2006 
Somali pastoralists in Sangailo village, Ijara District, notice symptoms consistent 
with RVF in their livestock 
Earliest recollection by pastoralists of appearance of mosquito swarms 
October 2006 
GEIS’s October report suggested there was an elevated risk of an RVF outbreak 
in East Africa, including northern Kenya, and that “ground surveillance and 
response to disease outbreaks” would likely be required during the next 2-6 
months 
November 2006 
EMPRES publish RVF warning in special issue of EMPRES Watch 
FAO and WHO sent warnings directly to the relevant national authorities 
30th November 2006 Estimated onset of symptoms in human RVF Index Case 
4th December 2006 Kenya DVS formally reports suspected RVF outbreak to OIE 
14th December 2006 Herdsman from Garissa admitted to hospital coughing/vomiting blood 
17th December 2006 Garissa Livestock Market closed 
20th December 2006 
11 deaths reported with unexplained febrile haemorrhagic illness in NEP 
RVF diagnosis confirmed in 10 of 19 patients 
20th December 2006 
Outbreak investigation launched by MoH, Kenya Field Epidemiology and 
Laboratory Training Program (FELTP), KEMRI, the Walter Reed Project of the 
U.S. Army Medical Research Unit, CDC-Kenya's Global Disease Detection Center, 
and other partners, including WHO and Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 
Prior to 20th 
December 2006 
Most cases were in young men who herded cattle 
After 20th December 
2006 
Distribution of cases by age/sex broadened: young women disproportionally 
affected, perhaps because they handle raw meat Children under five years and 
the elderly rarely affected 
21st December 2006 MoH formally declares RVF outbreak 
22nd December RVF confirmed in samples taken from sick livestock in Garissa District 
24th December 2006 Number of human cases being reported peaked (date of onset of symptoms) 
Late December 2006 
Field laboratory set up at Garissa Provincial Hospital by CDC, KEMRI and MoH 
Suspect and confirmed case definitions established 
27th December 2006 Ban on slaughter in Garissa District 
27th December 2006 
Local leaders in Garissa appeal to government to declare floods and RVF 
outbreak a national disaster 
Meetings between Garissa District officials and local religious leaders to 
publicise need to avoid home slaughter ahead of Eid-ul-azha 
31st December 2006 Eid-ul-azha – Muslim festival when 20,000 goats would usually be slaughtered in 
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Date  Event 
homes across Garissa District 
8th January 2007 
Livestock vaccination campaign started: initial target, 500,000 shoats and 
600,000 cattle in Garissa, Ijara, Wajir, Isiolo and Tana River Districts 
3 NGO vaccination teams operating in each district supported by FAO 
Policy was to vaccinate apparently unaffected herds of livestock in districts in 
which human or livestock RVF disease had been confirmed and also in adjacent 
districts 
Vaccination targeted 20 km wide belt surrounding affected areas 
10th January 2007 Additional 450,000 doses provided with USAID funds 
12th January 2007 
Over 8000 animals vaccinated to date under the supervision of the MoLFD and 
FAO 
Vector control spraying, human and animal surveillance and social mobilization 
activities continued 
15th January 2007 Initial 100,000 doses of Kenyan manufactured vaccine used up 
15th January 2007 MoH and MoLFD hold joint press conference 
15th January 2007 
As of 15th January 2007, a total of 248 cases and 95 deaths had been reported 
from the affected districts of Garissa, Ijara, Wajir, Tana River, Kilifi, Malindi 
and Taita Taveta 
Samples of suspected animal and human cases collected from Lamu district 
One confirmed case and one suspect case reported in the coastal district of 
Malindi 
15th January 2007 
MoH set up a team at national level to work on a national communication social 
mobilization strategy. The Kenya Red Cross and UNICEF worked with the team. 
National messages “would be finalised soon”. A WHO consultant for social 
mobilization was made available in Garissa 
16th January 
A team from Canada was deployed and set up a mobile lab in Malindi, Coastal 
Province 
19th January 2007 RVF outbreak spread to Isiolo, Wajir and Tana River districts 
29th January 2007 GoK reports it has spent US$ 1.4 million on medical care for RVF patients 
30th January 2007 USAID pledges additional 800,000 doses vaccine for delivery 1st February 
31st January 2007 400,000 head livestock vaccinated to date 
 Late January 2007 
RVF confirmed in: 3 districts in North Eastern Province (NEP), 5 districts Coast 
Province; 2 districts in Central Province; one district Rift Valley Province; one 
case in Nairobi but patient had visited NEP 
May 2007 684 human cases reported, 155 deaths reported 
 
 
• External support to the Government of Kenya 
Although the RVF response was led by the Kenyan Government, donors, international 
organizations and veterinary and medical NGOs provided a wide range of support.  
Funding included: 
• United Nations Central Emergency Relief Fund (UN/CERF) support to WHO and FAO totalling 
US$ 1.9 million 
• USAID/  United  Nations Office  for  the  Coordination  of  Humanitarian  Affairs (UN-OCHA): 
1,250,000 doses of livestock vaccine, worth US$ 480,000, and US$ 35,000 to support CDC’s 
assistance to MoLFD and MoH, plus additional support to the World Food Program (WFP) 
• While practical support included: 
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• Under the direction of the MoH, CDC/KEMRI set up a field laboratory at Garissa Provincial 
Hospital to facilitate rapid diagnosis and CDC also provided funds for government veterinary 
personnel’s field allowances  
• WHO provided a mobile laboratory, training in case management, and assistance with public 
health education  
• WFP provided food aid to people in flooded areas and helicopters to transport medical staff, 
equipment and medicines to affected areas 
• Various veterinary NGOs received funds from FAO and formed teams of technical staff with 
their partner organizations and government technicians to carry out livestock vaccinations. 
They also provided training for veterinary staff on RVF disease recognition, surveillance and 
control, and funded other veterinary treatments  
• Various medical NGOs provided transport to support the RVF sensitization campaign and to 
transport suspect cases to hospital 
• FAO provided training to veterinary staff to enhance ongoing surveillance and provided the 
veterinary laboratory in Kabete with ELISA kits (IgG and IgM) and other laboratory equipment. 
 
Additional technical assistance was also provided by an international team from the Global 
Outbreak Alert and Response Network (GOARN). An 11-member team from GOARN partner 
institutions and WHO (Country Office, Regional Office for Africa and Headquarters) supported the 
MoH, provincial and district health authorities in implementing public health measures to control 
the outbreak. GOARN partners included: a mobile laboratory team and two epidemiologists from 
the Public Health Agency of Canada (National Microbiology Laboratory, Canadian Science Centre for 
Human and Animal Health, and Canadian Field Epidemiology Programme), a technical expert on Rift 
Valley Fever and a case management/infection control expert from the National Institute of 
Communicable Diseases (NICD) and Department of Clinical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases, 
National Health Laboratory Service (NHLS) and the School of Pathology of the University of the 
Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, South Africa, and a three member social mobilization team from the 
US CDC and WHO Centre for Vulnerability Reduction, Tunisia. CDC-Kenya coordinated bilateral 
assistance from the US Departments of Agriculture, Defence and Health and Human Services. 
  
• In the end 
 
By March 2007, when the RVF outbreak in Kenya had abated, official reports showed that 155 
people had died and economic losses were estimated to amount to US$ 30 million. The impacts of 
the disease were felt not just by pastoralist producers but along the entire meat value chain. Some 
livestock traders and butchers were unable to resume business even after the bans on movement 
and slaughter of livestock in the affected areas were eventually lifted due to the depletion of their 
working capital. 
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2.2.2 The Ethiopian experience 
 
• Introduction 
 
Over the past 75 years or so, RVF has been reported and in most cases confirmed from a swathe of 
countries down the eastern side of Africa and also from across the Red Sea in the west of the 
Arabian Peninsula. This pattern broadly follows the Rift Valley - from Egypt in the north to South 
Africa in the south. However, cases of the disease in livestock have never been officially reported 
in Ethiopia or Eritrea, nor has the presence of the RVF virus been unequivocally demonstrated in 
these countries, although some reports mention possible human cases in southern Ethiopia during 
the RVF outbreak in the Horn of Africa in 1997/98, and there is some evidence of cryptic virus 
activity in the country. However, all the surrounding and a number of nearby countries, including 
Egypt, Sudan, Kenya, Somalia, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen, have reported cases in people and 
livestock during the past 30 years. Within the Horn of Africa in general there is considered to be a 
lack of transparency in reporting and publishing RVF surveillance results because of fear of negative 
impact upon the livestock trade, which has been estimated to be worth around US$ 600 million 
annually throughout the region. 
 
The ecology of the region of Saudi Arabia and Yemen (the Tihama ecotype of the eastern Rift Valley 
zone) affected by RVF is reported to be identical to the west floor of the Rift Valley in Ethiopia and 
Eritrea. Aedes mosquitoes - the primary vector of RVF and the species responsible for maintaining 
the virus between outbreaks - are very widely distributed, including in Ethiopia, and low-lying, 
semi-arid areas of the country are flood-prone. FAO considers that RVF virus “is probably present in 
all countries of sub-Saharan Africa”. 
 
The conditions necessary for the onset of RVF virus activity in an area are the occurrence of heavy 
and persistent rainfall over several months, together with the presence of the virus and susceptible 
livestock species. Heavy rainfall can lead to a rise in the water table which ultimately causes 
flooding. This is seen in East Africa in geomorphic formations called dambos - depressions found in 
grasslands prone to flooding. Rainfall of between two and ten-times mean annual values have been 
associated with periods of epizootic RVF. Flooding in semi-arid and arid zones can also occur in 
floodplains downstream from where the rainfall occurs, which can be on plateaus or mountain 
forest zones; examples of such at-risk areas include the watersheds of the Wabi Shabelle and 
Genale rivers in the Ethiopian plateau, which are prime pastoralist areas.  
 
Although RVF has never been formally confirmed in livestock in Ethiopia, outbreaks of the disease 
in other countries in the region none-the-less have dramatic impacts on Ethiopia’s export trade in 
live animals (both formal and informal ‘cross-border’ trade) and the growing trade in chilled and 
frozen beef and mutton carcasses and cuts. In the event of an RVF outbreak in East Africa and/or 
the Horn, bans on imports from the entire region tend to be imposed by the major importing 
countries, especially the Gulf States and Egypt, and these bans are often retained for lengthy 
periods. 
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• Ethiopia and livestock trade 
 
Ethiopia’s international livestock trade takes two main forms: export of live animals and export of 
chilled and frozen beef and mutton carcasses and cuts. The former is dominated by informal cross-
border trade in which livestock passes from ethnically Somali pastoralist regions of Ethiopia, 
especially Zone IV, into Somalia in exchange for consumer goods, from where live animals are 
mostly re-exported via the Djibouti quarantine and export facility to the Gulf States. It is estimated 
that this informal cross-border ‘contraband trade’ is up to 100-times larger than the formal, 
government-sanctioned trade in live animals.  
 
The export meat trade is centred on some six export abattoirs and four major private meat 
exporters. Cattle are purchased from pastoralists, finished in feedlots for three to four months, 
slaughtered and processed in the private abattoirs, and then exported as chilled or frozen carcasses 
and cuts. Sheep and goats are also slaughtered, processed and exported. Beef is mainly exported to 
Egypt, while mutton is mainly exported to the Gulf States, principally Saudi Arabia and the UAE. 
Official figures show that in 2006/07, Ethiopia earned more than US$ 56 million from the export of 
some 295,000 head of livestock and 6000 tonnes of meat products: Saudi Arabia and UAE accounted 
for 48% and 46% of the meat exports, respectively.  
 
The on-going Ethiopia Sanitary and Phytosanitary Standards and Livestock and Meat 
Marketing (SPS-LMM) programme, financed by USAID and implemented by Texas A&M University in 
cooperation with MOARD, has as its ambitious goal to increase exports of meat and meat products 
five-fold to 30,000 tonnes annually. 
 
The Ethiopian livestock and meat export trade is, however, extremely vulnerable to bans imposed 
by the importing countries: recently these have been triggered by disease outbreaks (actual or 
potential) including foot-and-mouth disease as well as RVF, and deficiencies observed at the export 
abattoirs during routine inspections by the importing countries. The demands of importing countries 
are not always clear, transparent or in accordance with the laid-down OIE requirements: for 
example, during the recent RVF outbreak in the Horn of Africa, the UAE imposed the ban on 
importation of meat from Ethiopia in mid-January - after the end of the Hajj, the annual pilgrimage 
to Mecca - although the highest risk period was probably during December 2006/early January 2007: 
neighbouring Kenya formally reported RVF in the north-east of the country in early December 2006. 
 
• Response in Ethiopia to RVF in East Africa 
 
Following the outbreak of RVF in Kenya in late 2006, the response in Ethiopia had three major 
components: an awareness raising and sensitization campaign targeted at the Kenya border area; 
some preventive measures including spraying livestock with ‘acaricide’ (most likely synthetic 
pyrethroids which are effective against biting insects as well as ticks); and official delegations 
dispatched to the major livestock and meat importing countries, mainly Egypt, Saudi Arabia and 
UAE, to lobby for and negotiate the lifting of the livestock and meat import bans imposed by these 
countries.  
 
The main actors in Ethiopia’s response to the RVF outbreak in neighbouring countries were the 
Government of Ethiopia supported by a number of international and national agencies, donor-
funded programmes and NGOs, including USAID, FAO, WHO and Save the Children.  
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The sensitization campaign was organized by the government, supported by FAO, USAID, and NGOs, 
including the SPS-LLM programme, and aimed to ensure that the at-risk population were aware of 
the symptoms of RVF so that they could report any cases encountered. The campaign included the 
production and distribution of pamphlets, which described RVF symptoms in local languages, by 
USAID and NGOs. 
 
The NGO Save the Children (US) undertook spraying of livestock with acaricide in the border area as 
a precautionary measure. At the regional level, the organizations that responded to the outbreak 
were: WHO, FAO, UNICEF, CDC, NGOs and the region’s governments. Coordination was done by 
WHO and FAO. These agencies together with their partners formed a regional task force, the Inter-
agency Standing Health Cluster, which helped in the dissemination of information to countries in 
the region, including Ethiopia. 
 
Table 2: Sequence of events  
Date Event 
Early October 2006 Somali pastoralists in Sangailo village, Ijara District, Kenya notice 
symptoms consistent with RVF in their livestock 
October 2006 GEIS’s October report suggested there was an elevated risk of an RVF 
outbreak in East Africa, including northern Kenya, and that “ground 
surveillance and response to disease outbreaks” would likely be required 
during the next 2-6 months 
November 2006 EMPRES publish RVF warning in special issue of EMPRES Watch: it was 
noted that there had been “increased and widespread rainfall over the last 
three months over most of Eastern and coastal Kenya, Somalia and 
Southern Ethiopia” but Ethiopia was not included in the list of countries 
which had an “elevated risk of RVF” 
FAO and WHO sent warnings directly to the relevant national authorities 
30th November 2006 Estimated onset of symptoms in human RVF Index Case in Kenya 
4th December 2006 Kenya DVS formally reports suspected RVF outbreak to OIE 
20th December 2006 Active surveillance for RVF commenced by Ethiopian MoARD and FMOH in 
areas bordering Kenya 
Assessment teams sent to Somali Region and South Omo Zone, SNNPR. The 
teams, comprised of personnel from MoARD, FMOH, WHO and FAO, report 
back to the National Coordination Committee, chaired by MoARD 
January 2007 Meeting held between WHO, FMOH, MoARD and FAO 
WHO provided technical support through consultants sent to SNNPR, 
Tigray, Afar, Somali, Oromia 
4 January 2007 A Nairobi-based FAO team, drawn from animal health experts in a number 
of countries of the Horn of Africa, work with veterinary departments in 
Kenya, Somalia and Ethiopia to address the RVF outbreak in the region 
In Ethiopia, officials from WHO and various international aid agencies 
present in the area assist an FAO team to draw up preparedness, 
communication, surveillance and response activities 
29 December 2006 – 3 
January 2007 
Hajj – annual pilgrimage to Mecca 
  
17th January Preventive measures to control RVF taken in Ethiopia, but no cases have 
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Date Event 
yet been reported 
Livelihood impacts of RVF in the form of drastically reduced market access 
for pastoralists in Ethiopia 
UAE announces a ban on all animal products from the Horn of Africa 
January 2007 Import bans imposed by Egypt and Saudi Arabia 
20th February 2007 “Despite the ban imposed by UAE, which has affected our livestock 
market, no threat of Rift Valley Fever has been detected anywhere within 
the country" Amsalu Demisse, acting head, Ethiopian Veterinary 
Department 
22nd February 2007 Ethiopian delegation led by Abera Deresa, state Minister of Agriculture and 
Rural Development, travel to UAE to push for lifting of import ban by UAE: 
“there was no sign that the fever had or would hit Ethiopia” 
UAE government promised to lift ban 
Saudi Arabia later sent their own delegation to Ethiopia to assess the 
situation 
March 2007 Meat imports from Ethiopia still banned by UAE 
Live animal imports to UAE from Ethiopia allowed once they had 
completed quarantine/testing in Djibouti 
Meat prices in Ethiopia drop: producer prices for beef down from Birr 8 to 
6.5; mutton down from Birr 9 to 6.5-7  
March 2007 Intensification of RVF surveillance 
Funds reported to have been received from UN-OCHA to assist FMOH in 
preventing and controlling a possible RVF outbreak 
WHO reported to be recruiting and deploying two national consultants to 
provide technical support in high risk regions  
Information on current situation in Ethiopia is monitored in collaboration 
with FMOH, MoARD, FAO and partners 
WHO ensure continued information exchange amongst partners 
March 2007 RVF outbreak in neighbouring Kenya and Somalia abates: no cases of RVF in 
either livestock or people detected in Ethiopia 
May 2007 Preparation underway by WHO to conduct training for health workers on 
RVF surveillance in identified high risk zones 
Areas targeted for training include Afder and Liben zones in Somali Region, 
South Omo zone in SNNPR and Borena zone in Oromiya Region 
RVF surveillance guidelines for health facility and community workers and 
Standard Operating Procedure for specimen collection, storage and 
transportation have now been developed by WHO 
 
 
 
2.2.3 The outbreak unraveled 
 
• Kenya 
 
RVF outbreaks in the Horn of Africa are intrinsically linked to unusually heavy rainfall and flooding 
events, which can be forecast with some degree of accuracy. It would thus appear that the disease 
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would be well suited to early warning linked to appropriate, timely and pre-planned responses. 
However, this was not the case in 2006/07: why not? 
 
The RVF early warning is generated through a joint initiative of the NASA Goddard Space Flight 
Center and the US Department of Defence Global Emerging Infections Surveillance and Response 
System (DoD GEIS) that utilises various remotely-sensed data to which these organizations have 
access. It appears that this is an example of a technology seeking an application rather than 
necessarily the most appropriate solution to a problem. The monthly RVF risk bulletins present a 
variety of remotely-sensed measurements, including abnormal sea surface temperatures, cloudiness 
and outgoing long-wave radiation anomalies, all of which have been linked to heavier than normal 
rainfall in East Africa. The actual monthly RVF risk map - perhaps the most important part of the 
bulletin - is based on persistently positive anomalies in an index of vegetation growth (the 
normalized density vegetation index: NDVI). NDVI time-series show a positive response to rainfall, 
especially in semi-arid areas, which means that NDVI data can be used as a measure of the 
magnitude and persistence of widespread and prolonged rainfall events. On the RVF risk maps, 
pixels that show a positive NDVI anomaly above a specified threshold value for three successive 
months and which lie in RVF endemic areas are shown as ‘RVF risk areas’. The RVF risk maps, 
therefore, are not forecasts of where heavy and persistent rainfall might occur, and cause flooding 
and RVF outbreaks; rather they indicate where heavy and persistent rainfall has occurred, where 
flooding might occur soon (or possibly already has), and where RVF outbreaks could occur (or might 
already be present).  
 
The US team behind the RVF early warning system are both physically and culturally distant from 
the actual situation on the ground: the scientists clearly inhabit a very different world to that of 
the pastoralists of the Horn. The RVF early warning mechanisms are not embedded in local, 
national or regional knowledge networks, nor are they provided directly to the pastoralists. Rather, 
the RVF risk assessments are simply generated on a monthly basis and posted on the DoD GEIS 
website for anyone to use as they wish. They come with a strong ‘health warning’; it is explained 
that the information is presented as a ‘statement of research for the purpose of scientific 
validation and review’. Specialists at the FAO and WHO pick up on these monthly bulletins, analyse 
and reinterpret them and, when appropriately repackaged, distribute them via an internet-based 
newsletter and also by direct contact with the responsible authorities in the at-risk countries. In 
2006/07, by the time the RVF warnings had been generated and distributed, more than a month 
had passed since pastoralists had reported the first suspected cases in their livestock. 
 
The RVF early warning system does not, therefore, seem to respond to clear demand from the 
affected countries to provide a sufficiently early ‘early’ warning, or to be linked to any response 
procedure. To date, there have not been any attempts to combine the local knowledge and 
observations of those at the front-line – pastoralists, CAHWs, local-level government officials, local 
NGO staff, community-based organization members and others – with the remotely sensed data. In 
the 2006/07 outbreak, pastoralists including CAHWs reported suspected cases well before the 
‘early’ warning was issued. A mechanism or process that would facilitate integrating field-level 
observations with remotely sensed data would seem to offer a significant advance over the 
currently used system. In addition, better use of the available heavy rainfall foresight technology 
could enable increasing levels of risk to be identified and acted upon earlier – assuming that the 
appropriate response capacity would be available.  
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A participatory assessment undertaken shortly after the RVF outbreak demonstrated that the 
Somali pastoralists and the CAHWs in Kenya, who themselves are pastoralists and livestock keepers 
who have received some rudimentary animal health training, were highly adept at recognizing the 
symptoms of RVF, correctly associating the disease with risk factors such as heavy rainfall, flooding 
and swarms of a rarely seen mosquito, and they recalled that this was similar to the previous RVF 
outbreak that had occurred some 10 years earlier. Some pastoralists reported the situation to local 
government officers, but prior experience had taught them to have low expectations; with 
previously reported livestock disease outbreaks they had often witnessed no response from the 
veterinary department.  
 
The first response to the disease in Kenya was therefore at the local level; pastoralists resorted to 
various available, albeit mostly inappropriate, traditional and modern treatments, including use of 
smoke to repel the clouds of mosquitoes, reading from the Koran, and administration of 
trypanocidal drugs and antibiotics. Pastoralists and CAHWs are able to treat many disease 
conditions that occur locally using a combination of their indigenous knowledge and treatments, 
and modern medicines. In the case of RVF, however, there are no effective curative remedies that 
can be deployed and they do not currently have access to RVF vaccines.  
 
Some of the district veterinary offices which received the first reports from the field thought that 
the abortion storms, which are usually the first symptom of RVF in livestock, could have been 
caused by another disease, trypanosomiasis. This suggests that the RVF warnings received from the 
FAO by the chief veterinary officer had not been forwarded to the districts at most risk or, if they 
had, that insufficient attention had been drawn to them. However, even if the warnings and field 
reports had been linked up, there would have been little the front-line veterinary staff could have 
done. There was no contingency plan for RVF in Kenya. Funds for routine operations are limited and 
there was no provision at any level of the veterinary services (national, provincial or district) for 
access to emergency funding to allow an effective and timely investigation and response to be 
launched. Access to national and international emergency funding could have been triggered if the 
RVF outbreak had been declared a national disaster – but this was not done on this occasion. 
Perhaps the reason for this was that, whilst the situation was undoubtedly serious, this act of last 
resort is reserved for other more widespread and, arguably, even more serious disasters, such as 
severe and widespread drought – although politics and vested interest are equally likely to have 
been a factor. The actual physical ability to respond was further constrained by the challenging 
practical situation in the affected area: wide-spread flooding and impassable dirt roads made it 
virtually impossible to move around by vehicles, and in any case very few running vehicles were 
available to veterinary department personnel. Only when cases of people with severe haemorrhagic 
symptoms started to report at local health facilities did an official response finally swing into 
action. Helicopters, the only effective means of moving around the affected areas, were then made 
available to the Ministry of Health, and veterinary department personnel were able to hitch a ride 
and gain access to the affected area.  
 
Although livestock play an important role in the livelihoods of millions of people in Kenya, livestock 
have long been under-valued and under-resourced by the Government, and the veterinary 
department enjoys little influence in the corridors of power. Pastoralist areas have never been well 
served by state veterinary services: in the colonial era, services were largely focused on the needs 
of settler farmers; post-independence, although veterinary services were refocused to better meet 
the needs of local small-scale farmers, these services generally had little impact in remote 
pastoralist areas. Following the advent of World Bank-driven structural adjustment programs 
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(SAPs), state veterinary services were scaled back and the roles of the public and private sector 
better defined. Clinical services, for example, were now regarded as a private good. Although it 
was hoped that the private sector would fill in the gaps left by state veterinary service, there have 
been few incentives for private practitioners to establish private practices other than in and around 
major urban centres. The prospect of establishing private practices in the harsh, remote 
environments where pastoralists live was particularly unattractive. NGOs established community-
based animal health services in response to the needs of pastoralists. Initially the veterinary 
profession and the state veterinary service were largely hostile to CAHWs. Over time, however, this 
hostility has dissipated and today the role of CAHWs is formally recognized in [thus far unendorsed] 
policy documents both within Kenya and internationally: the OIE, for example, now accepts that 
CAHWs, in certain circumstances, can be part of a country’s formal disease surveillance system. 
 
A key feature of pastoralism is mobility; rainfall tends to be very localized and erratic and 
pastoralists move their herds and flocks to take advantage of pockets of rainfall and the resultant 
growth of pasture and browse. Access to traditional wet and dry season grazing areas has, however, 
been increasingly restricted over recent decades, including through the creation of national parks 
and reserves, settlement of farmers and agro-pastoralists in valleys and along rivers, as well as 
through the generally increased pressure from human and livestock population growth. All of this is 
exacerbated by a long-term trend of decreased rainfall and an increased frequency of extreme 
weather events, including both drought and floods. Insecurity and regional conflict, both 
exacerbated by the ready availability of weapons, and the presence in the region of a failed state 
(Somalia) all serve to further restrict mobility. In the more distant past, pastoralists would have 
had far greater freedom to move their animals and families to avoid floods - and thus RVF-, 
localized droughts or other disease outbreaks, albeit within a framework imposed by traditional 
rangeland management systems. But with the current restrictions on mobility, and strong 
encouragement by the government to adopt a more sedentary lifestyle, this is now less of an 
option.  
 
The Somali pastoralist of north-eastern Kenya are isolated from decision makers in Nairobi not just 
by long distances and bad roads but also culturally; they speak a different language and practice a 
different religion to the majority of Kenyans and are more closely aligned to neighbouring Somalia 
than to the rest of Kenya. North-eastern Kenya is one of the poorest parts of the country: its people 
are marginalized and are poorly served by the state in terms of education, health or any other 
public services. Even with the explosive growth of mobile phone networks in Kenya (from very few 
to more than 12.5 million subscribers in less than 5 years), large parts of north-eastern Kenya 
remain outside the network. They also have very few alternative livelihood options beyond 
livestock rearing: even there the long-term prospects look increasingly bleak given the trend of 
movement restrictions, decreasing rainfall and the increasing frequency of extreme weather 
events. 
 
Once news of the RVF outbreak started to emerge, there was considerable coverage by the media. 
Not all the information disseminated in the media was accurate: the technical experts in the line 
ministries considered that this misinformation was a contributory factor in the panic that gripped 
Nairobi. This contributed to a collapse in the market for red meat in the capital, although in fact 
the risk to consumers was virtually nil. The panic in Nairobi was also fuelled by reports that one 
patient with RVF had been admitted to the main government hospital in the city. Whilst this was 
true, the patient had been infected in north-eastern Kenya, from where he travelled to the capital 
and where he was taken ill. Adding to the confusion in the early stages of the outbreak, the state 
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veterinary and medical services initially put out contradictory information regarding the safety of 
consuming livestock products in the at-risk area: whilst the medical authorities suggested that meat 
and milk should not be consumed, the veterinary authorities recommended that inspected and 
properly cooked meat and boiled milk were safe. Later, the two services aligned their messages; 
however, lack of pre-prepared, tested and unequivocal messages targeted at the different at-risk 
groups was a clear constraint. Traditionally, the veterinary and medical services have operated 
separately from each other, reporting to entirely different line ministries. Rather disappointingly, 
despite the vast amount of expenditure on preparedness for highly pathogenic avian influenza, 
including a number of initiatives in Kenya, there appears to have been little beneficial spill-over of 
these approaches to the management of another zoonotic disease, RVF. 
 
The media also found it difficult in the early stages to gain access to well-informed representatives 
of the veterinary and medical services to provide the information they needed and to answer their 
questions. The fact that the outbreak occurred during the Christmas and New Year holiday period, 
the main annual break for the majority of Kenyans, added to the difficulties. 
 
As awareness of the RVF outbreak spread and criticism of the speed and adequacy of the 
government response mounted, the situation became increasingly politicized and there was 
pressure to be seen to be doing something – anything! RVF outbreaks in the Horn are essentially 
self-limiting – they persist only as long as floodwater provides the conditions needed for mosquitoes 
to breed: by the time cases have been detected the epidemic curve is likely to be reaching or has 
already reached  its peak, so whatever action is taken -including doing nothing - the outbreak will 
inevitably come to an end.  
 
Following the 2006/07 outbreak a number of interventions were made, including closure of 
livestock markets, bans of movement of livestock from the affected areas, bans on the slaughter of 
livestock, warnings about the danger of consuming raw milk or uncertified meat, vaccination of 
livestock, treatment of livestock with pour-on or spray formulations of insecticide and distribution 
of mosquito nets. Whilst these interventions demonstrated to the affected population and the 
wider ‘worried well’ that public action was being taken, and is likely to have decreased panic, and 
some may have had additional benefits associated with them – such as application of insecticide 
controlling ticks on livestock and distribution of insecticide-treated mosquito nets helping to 
prevent malaria – it is questionable how appropriate they were in the control of RVF. In the first 
described case of RVF, which occurred in a flock of sheep near Naivasha in 1930, the outbreak was 
effectively brought to an end by moving the sheep up the escarpment to an altitude where the 
vector (Aedes mosquitoes) were absent. This suggests that the disease probably cannot be 
introduced into an area through the movement of infected livestock; that the right environmental 
conditions need to be present simultaneously: the virus, vectors and a population of susceptible 
livestock. The outbreak in Tanzania in 2007, for example, is unlikely to have ‘spread’ from Kenya as 
has sometimes been inaccurately suggested; rather the necessary conditions (heavy rainfall and 
persistent flooding) occurred in Tanzania a little later than in Kenya and, since the RVF virus and 
susceptible livestock were present, an outbreak ensued. If this is indeed correct, the necessity for 
movement control is perhaps questionable.  
 
This illustrates, however, that there is a general absence of sound evidence to guide which 
interventions are appropriate in the event of an RVF outbreak. During the outbreak, butchers in 
Nairobi started to display meat inspection certificates in their shop windows. This seemed to 
reassure customers that the meat being offered for sale was safe. Although demand for red meat in 
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general declined during the outbreak, sales from one supplier actually increased as the newly 
revived parastatal Kenya Meat Commission apparently came to be seen as a trusted source of meat. 
 
RVF is a difficult disease to do research on, which perhaps explains why there are a surprisingly 
large number of gaps in the understanding of relatively basic aspects of the disease’s epidemiology. 
For example, much of the disease literature suggests that human cases can occur as a result of 
transmission of the virus via mosquitoes, whereas records of actual cases show that these occur 
mainly in those people directly exposed to infected livestock or tissues derived from them including 
aborted foetuses, i.e. herders, slaughterhouse workers, butchers, animal health workers and, to a 
lesser extent, women who handle raw meat: the elderly and children, for example, rarely become 
infected, although presumably they too are exposed to mosquitoes. Two factors that make doing 
research on RVF difficult are the challenging physical conditions that accompany disease outbreaks, 
such as widespread flooding and impassable roads, and the episodic nature of the disease: it is 
difficult to establish an effective field-based research programme for a disease that may not occur 
for a decade or more. The disease is also difficult and costly to research in a laboratory context 
because of the risk the virus presents: health and safety regulations and good laboratory practice 
would demand the highest level of containment. 
 
The episodic nature of the disease also presents specific challenges in the application of the lessons 
learned from previous outbreaks. With an interval between outbreaks of up to 20 years, personnel 
who were actively involved in previous outbreaks are unlikely to still be in their posts for the next. 
As a result there is little or no institutional memory on the disease. Coupled with the lack of 
written contingency plans or specific mechanisms to capture lessons learned, each new outbreak 
exposes the responsible authorities and front-line staff to a very steep learning curve. 
 
The currently available vaccines for RVF, which have been on the market for 50 years or more, are 
far from ideal but in the past there have been few incentives to develop new ones. Low uptake of 
vaccination by pastoralists was reported during the 2006/2007 outbreak. This was partly because 
there was confusion about what classes of livestock should be presented for vaccination, but also 
because the pastoralists knew, or rapidly found out through experience, that vaccinated animals 
tended to abort. Some pastoralists complained that they had not been warned that this was a likely 
side-effect of vaccination. Vaccination against RVF in the Greater Horn of Africa presents a number 
of challenges. Indeed some experts consider that these are so great that they effectively preclude 
the use of vaccines to prevent/control RVF outbreaks in this region – although they are effectively 
used in other regions where the epidemiology of the disease, environmental conditions and 
infrastructure are different, e.g. southern Africa. 
 
The current Smithburn vaccine has a shelf-life of around 4 years, while the average interval 
between outbreaks in the Greater Horn has been around 10 years, it has been closer to 20 years 
during some inter-epizootic periods. Hard pressed veterinary authorities with many demands on 
their scarce resources are understandably reluctant to maintain vaccine stocks for a disease which 
occurs intermittently and which are likely to expire before they are used. For sound commercial 
reasons the manufacturers also avoid maintaining large stocks which are likely to reach their expiry 
dates before they can be sold. However, the lead-time needed by manufacturers to produce new 
batches of vaccine can be several months. Waiting until an RVF outbreak is highly likely or actually 
occurring will leave too little time for the manufacturers to respond. Even if the manufacturers did 
have adequate vaccine stocks, waiting until the heavy rains and flooding have begun means that it 
is then very difficult, often impossible, to transport and distribute vaccine in remote areas which 
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have no all-weather roads. In a recent assessment, carried out by the International Livestock 
Research Institute (ILRI), it was estimated that for a successful vaccination programme to be 
carried out in an at-risk area, an early warning would need to be issued and acted upon more than 
140 days before the first case occurred. This timing was based on the assumption that stocks of 
vaccine would need to be ordered, manufactured, shipped, distributed within the at-risk area, and 
the vaccination campaign carried out on a sufficiently large-scale to prevent the outbreak.  
 
Several recent global developments have increased interest in RVF. RVF is regarded as a possible 
weapon for bioterrorists and as such the disease has attracted the attention of the US military. As a 
result, new vaccines have been developed for use in people - primarily to protect US soldiers - and 
also for use in livestock, but these are not yet widely available. GALVmed, a new public-private 
partnership funded by DFID and the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, established to develop and 
make available livestock vaccines and other animal health products that address the problems 
facing poor livestock keepers, has prioritized RVF as one of its first targets. It plans to introduce 
two new RVF livestock vaccines: a multivalent one that will provide simultaneous protection against 
lumpy skin, sheep and goat pox and RVF, and one that can be used in the face of an RVF outbreak. 
Because of the often lengthy intervals between RVF outbreaks, and the available vaccine’s 
undesirable side-effects, it has not been considered desirable or feasible to routinely vaccinate 
livestock in at-risk areas in the Horn. However, the idea behind the new multivalent vaccine is that 
protection against the other diseases, all of which are significant on-going threats to livestock in 
the areas at risk from RVF in the Horn, will provide the incentive to use the vaccine routinely. In 
doing so, RVF protection will be provided almost as a bonus. This approach offers the possibility of 
avoiding future outbreaks, and also of preventing a number of other economically important 
livestock diseases. Some challenges remain, however, such as who pays – pastoralists or 
government, i.e. is the herd immunity this approach could provide a public or private good? Who 
will carry out the regular vaccination campaigns? If vaccine usage is to be mainstreamed in these 
areas there also needs to be a major change in the way pastoralists view disease control: they are 
often more likely to wait until a disease occurs and then attempt to treat it than adopt a 
preventive approach – particularly if they are unconvinced of the benefits vaccination is likely to 
bring. 
  
The potential spread of diseases, especially vector-borne diseases, beyond their traditional 
geographical foci under various climate change scenarios, also means that multinational veterinary 
companies are now taking interest in diseases such as RVF which have the potential to spread to 
new areas. In this respect, the recent experience with bluetongue in Europe is relevant: whilst the 
disease was largely confined to the tropics, the disease was neglected. However, as soon as it 
became established and started to spread in Europe, governments and veterinary pharmaceutical 
companies took interest. Within a few years a new and effective vaccine had been developed and 
was being widely used in the newly affected areas. 
 
Shortly before the 2006/07 outbreak Ethiopia, supported by the US, had ousted the Islamic Courts 
from Mogadishu. The Muslim pastoralists in north-eastern Kenya were apprehensive when the Kenya 
veterinary authorities wanted to vaccinate their animals, suspecting this may be a ploy to reduce 
their herds. This is illustrative of the general lack of trust between the pastoralists and government 
officials. In this case the government engaged with the local imams who played a key role in 
convincing the pastoralists that there was no hidden agenda behind the vaccination campaign.  
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As the narrative has highlighted, a major problem is that the various actors with a stake or interest 
in RVF control remain largely unconnected. Divisional and district veterinary offices in the 
northeast have poor linkages with both the widely dispersed pastoralist population and the 
veterinary department in Nairobi. At headquarters level, the Director of Veterinary Services and 
Director of Medical Services do not have a tradition of close cooperation and there are few 
mechanisms to promote closer collaboration and integration. There is a disconnect between the 
instigators of the early warning system and the veterinary and medical authorities, who are their 
prime target audience. NGOs which specialize in veterinary interventions often coordinate their 
activities poorly, both with other NGOs and with the state veterinary service. They do have the 
advantage, however, of being able to respond relatively quickly. Donors, on the other hand, are 
often poorly equipped to react to fast-onset disasters. And whilst the coordination between the 
main actors improved as the outbreak progressed, the most critical period is during the early 
warning stage and at the start of the outbreak.  
 
The 2006/07 RVF outbreak affected not just Kenya but also Somalia and Tanzania. In addition, 
although the disease was not detected in Ethiopia, the country suffered nonetheless when the Gulf 
States banned the importation of livestock from the entire Horn of Africa (see below). As the 
disease is likely to occur in more than one country in the region at one time, and to have 
implications for the entire region’s trade, a regional approach would appear to be beneficial. 
During this outbreak Kenya bought up the entire stock of RVF vaccine available in South Africa; 
when the disease occurred some weeks later in Tanzania there was no further vaccine available. 
 
The Gulf States are major international players in the livestock sector of the Horn of Africa through 
their imports of large numbers of live animals and, increasingly, also of meat. Although Kenya is not 
involved in the export of live animals, it does export some meat. It has long been thought that the 
Gulf States use RVF as a blunt political or economic tool: bans imposed in response to actual or 
suspected outbreaks of RVF are often kept in place for much longer than can be justified on disease 
risk grounds. In the process alternative suppliers emerge to take advantage of the market 
opportunities the bans provide.  
 
• Ethiopia 
 
Not surprisingly given the different experiences and potential risks of RVF in the two countries, the 
response to the threat of RVF in Ethiopia differed from that in Kenya. The immediate response by 
the Ethiopian authorities to the outbreak of RVF in neighbouring Kenya was to initiate surveillance 
and awareness raising activities in the border zone and at-risk pastoralist areas. This was done by 
the MoARD and FMOH supported by WHO, FAO and various international aid agencies, who also 
drew up plans for response activities; in the event these were not required, although SCF (US) 
undertook precautionary measures in the form of administration of insecticide to livestock. 
Surveillance in the Ethiopia-Somalia border area was considered to have been constrained by the 
then on-going conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia.  
 
Although sector coordination appeared to be reasonably good, the dominant players were 
government and international agencies. The private sector is relatively under-developed in Ethiopia 
and actors from this sector played little part in the countries response to RVF. Also, those most 
directly affected by the RVF ban – the pastoralist livestock keepers and traders - are marginalized 
in Ethiopia: they have little voice or influence in government circles. As in Kenya, absence of a 
carefully considered contingency plan hampered a timely and effective response. For example, 
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WHO only developed surveillance guidelines and standard operating procedures for specimen 
collection, storage and transport in May 2007 – several months after the peak risk. 
 
Livestock export bans from the Horn of Africa are highly controversial and are regarded by many as 
being highly politicized measures. Although RVF has never been diagnosed in livestock in Ethiopia, 
and was not detected in the country during the 2006/07 outbreak that occurred in Kenya, Somalia 
and Tanzania, none-the-less Ethiopia was included in the blanket bans on imports of live animals 
and meat by the Gulf States. It is significant, however, that the bans were imposed only after the 
annual hajj, when up to 15 million small ruminants are required for ritual slaughter – with the 
majority of these being imported from East Africa and the Horn of Africa. The 2006/07 hajj took 
place in late December and early January, thereby coinciding with the probable peak of the 
epidemic curve in Kenya and the highest risk of an outbreak in Ethiopia. But imports bans were only 
imposed by the Gulf State authorities in mid January, well after the hajj. This clearly illustrates the 
imbalance of power between the exporting countries in East Africa and the Horn and the importing 
countries in the Gulf States, with the latter calling the shots and responding to the potential or 
actual threat from RVF in a manner that primarily met their own needs. In particular it 
demonstrates that the Ethiopia authorities were unable to demonstrate to the Gulf States that they 
were RVF-free. Although a high-level Ethiopian delegation travelled to UAE to argue for the ban to 
be lifted, and apparently received a promise from the UAE authorities that this would occur, a 
month or so later the ban was still in place. An important element in innovation response capacity, 
that of trust, was apparently largely absent between the Ethiopian and Gulf State authorities.  
 
There is little evidence to suggest that any significant learning occurred during the 2006/07 RVF 
threat: in all probability the response in Ethiopia to the next RVF outbreak in the Horn will not have 
benefited from experience gained during the previous one.  
 
2.3 Case Study 2: Drought in South-Eastern Ethiopia, 2005/06 
 
2.3.1 The Southern Somali Ecosystem 
 
“Drought is no longer a slow onset disaster in the region, but a chronic emergency.” 
Source: FAO (2006) FAO Horn of Africa Regional Drought Response, FAO, Rome 
 
The southern Somali ecosystem, straddling north-western Kenya, south-eastern Ethiopia and 
southern Somalia, is an arid and semi-arid region predominantly inhabited by pastoralists and agro-
pastoralists, with some settled farmers and a few urban centres. Rainfall, in the range of 400-600 
mm per annum, is usually distributed between two rainy seasons: one from the end of March to July 
(known as the Gu season in Ethiopia and Somalia) and the second from October to early December 
(known as the Deyr season).  
 
Localized droughts have occurred every 3 to 5 years, whilst major droughts have been reported to 
occur anywhere between four or five times a century to every 10 years or so.  
A recent analysis by NASA of rainfall records from the 1950s onwards has shown that rainfall in the 
East African region during this period has steadily declined and that this is linked to rising Indian 
Ocean temperatures: rain that previously fell on land is now falling in the ocean. This has resulted 
in particularly significant declines in rainfall in the already dry Somali ecosystem. The current 
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predictions are that this decline will continue, with a 15% reduction in rainfall occurring every 20-
25 years (NASA 2008). Major drought events have been recorded in Ethiopia in 1973-74, 1984-85, 
1999-2000, 2001-2002 and 2005-2006 and again at the present time. 
 
The dynamics of cattle populations in these regions are typically one of ‘boom and bust’, but the 
periodic crashes do not appear to be simply related to the occurrence of drought. In a study 
undertaken (Desta 2001) in the Borana Plateau of southern Ethiopia over a 17 year period from 1980 
to 1997, marked decreases in cattle numbers occurred in 1983/85 and 1991/92 (and also just after 
the study period in 1998/99) when herd sizes dropped by between 37% and 62%. Whilst the 
decreases in 1983/85 coincided with a severe drought, from 1986 to 1997 annual rainfall varied 
relatively little, and yet the cattle population crashed again in 1991/92 - a year when rainfall was 
close to the long-term average of 706 mm. The study concluded that the crashes in cattle 
populations were due to interactions between the stocking density and rainfall: if stocking densities 
exceeded 20 head of cattle per square kilometre, even modest reductions in rainfall resulted in 
severe decreases in cattle numbers.  
 
The main cause of these losses was death due to starvation resulting from a ‘forage crisis’: the 
higher the stocking rate and the greater the rainfall deficit, the higher the rate of loss. The study 
also suggested that system stability was declining: between 1980 and 1997, the average household 
cattle holding decreased by 37% from 92 to 58 head. Population growth during this period, 
however, means that the number of households will have increased. 
In addition to the harsh environment and decreasing rainfall, and increasing frequency of drought, 
pastoralists in the region face other threats and challenges. The region is remote and has poorly 
developed infrastructure, limited availability of services and low levels of education and literacy. 
Access to traditional grazing land has been steadily reduced due to settlement and the expansion of 
arable farming, especially irrigation schemes in the fertile valleys that have occupied areas that 
were previously used for dry season grazing.  
 
Widespread encroachment by the alien invasive shrub Prosopis spp, originally introduced to 
stabilize banks of irrigation channels, has created dense thickets which are now inaccessible to 
livestock, whilst indiscriminate development of bore-holes has contributed to degradation of some 
wet season grazing zones. The pastoralists of the Somali Region of south-eastern Ethiopia are more 
closely integrated with neighbouring Somalia and the Gulf States than the rest of Ethiopia. 
Unofficial cross-border trade in livestock from Ethiopia to Somalia - from where they are re-
exported to Gulf States - is estimated to exceed formal trade by a factor of 100. The Ethiopian 
government, however, regards this historic trade, in which cattle are often swapped for consumer 
goods which are then sold on, as ‘contraband trade’ and attempts to suppress it. There have also 
been a number of bans by the Gulf States on the import of livestock from the Horn of Africa region 
over recent decades due to outbreaks of Rift Valley fever. There is perceived to be an anti-
pastoralist bias by the dominant highland culture in Ethiopia, and civil unrest and general insecurity 
in the region compound an already difficult situation.  
 
This case study is focused on livestock-related aspects of the emergency response in south-eastern 
Ethiopia during the drought of 2005/06. 
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2.3.2 The drought of 2005/06 
 
The 2005/06 drought is estimated to have affected 1.7 million pastoralists in south-eastern 
Ethiopia, the vast majority of who were ethnically Somali with the remainder being members of the 
Borana community. The worst affected areas were the Somali, Oromiya and Afar regions.  
 
2.3.3 Drought emergency management in Ethiopia 
 
Ethiopia has a tiered government system: in addition to the national level, a federal government 
oversees regional states, zones, districts (woredas) and neighborhoods (kebele). Under the 
constitution, considerable power is delegated to regional states which can establish their own 
government and implement their own policies through an executive committee and regional 
sectoral bureaus. Following on from the devastating droughts and associated famines of the 1980s, 
drought response in Ethiopia is now regulated by the government’s 1993 National Policy for Disaster 
Prevention, Preparedness and Management, while the Directives for Disaster Prevention and 
Management articulates implementation modalities and the associated institutional set up.  
 
Since 1993 to the present day there have been a series of changes to the agencies responsible for 
implementing these policies. First the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, later the Disaster 
Prevention and Preparedness Commission (DPPC), and more recently the Disaster Prevention and 
Preparedness Agency (DPPA) have in turn been responsible for developing national infrastructure 
and systems to assess and respond to food aid needs. In early 2004, the Food Security Coordination 
Bureau was created to focus on the causes of chronic food insecurity, and the mandate of the DPPC 
(now the DPPA) shifted to responding only to emergencies and unpredictable events.  So, 
responsibility for interventions are divided between the DPPA, which responds to the acute needs 
of the unpredictable food insecure, and the Food Security Coordination Bureau (FSCB) within the 
Ministry of Agriculture & Rural Development (MoARD), which focuses on improving long-term food 
and livelihood security for the chronically food insecure through safety net interventions and other 
food security programmes. The DPPA retains responsibility for coordinating emergency responses 
for both food and non-food assistance in Ethiopia. The Early Warning Department (EWD) within the 
DPPA is responsible for early warning activities in Ethiopia. The diagram below shows the linkages 
at the various levels from local to national. The Early Warning Working Group, made up of line 
ministries, UN agencies and NGOs, contributes to the early warning monitoring capacity through 
four main mechanisms: 
 
• regular monitoring of key standard indicators collected in disaster prone woredas 
• pre and post-harvest assessments  
• disaster area assessment (for assessing the impact of rapid-onset disasters such as flooding)  
• pastoral area assessment  
• In 2005, in an attempt to change the focus from emergency assistance towards longer-term 
development, the government launched the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP). Under the 
PSNP, the Ethiopian government makes a distinction between two groups: 
• The ‘unpredictably food insecure’, who face transitory food deficits because of erratic weather 
or other livelihood shocks. This group continues to receive food aid and other humanitarian 
assistance as needed. 
• The ‘predictably food insecure’, who face chronic food deficits because of poverty rather than 
food shocks, receive cash or food transfers, for work or freely, on a regular, predictable basis 
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for a fixed period of five years. Together with complementary interventions such as ‘livelihoods 
packages’, it is envisaged that this should enable these households to escape from their chronic 
food insecurity over time after which they will no longer receive any social assistance except 
during emergencies. 
 
However, by the onset of the 2005/06 drought the PSNP had not yet been implemented in the main 
pastoralist areas. The main mechanism for resource mobilization during an emergency is an appeal 
made by the Government of Ethiopia, UN agencies and humanitarian partners, known as the Joint 
Humanitarian Appeal (JHA). Such ‘emergency’ appeals have been launched every year for the past 
three decades.  
 
Structure of DPPA :  
 
 
 
 
 
National Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Agency (DPPA)
(DPPA as secretariat) 
National Early 
Warning System 
National Crisis 
Management 
Regional Disaster Prevention 
and Preparedness Committee 
Regional Early 
Warning System 
Regional Crisis 
Management 
Zonal Disaster Prevention and 
Preparedness Committee 
Zonal Early Warning 
System 
Zonal Crisis 
Management 
Woreda Disaster Prevention 
and Preparedness Committee 
Woreda Early 
Warning System at 
MoA
Development 
Agents (DA) 
Community
NGO National 
Office 
NGO Regional 
Office 
NGO Zonal 
Office 
NGO at Woreda  
Source: Based on Abate 2003 
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As mentioned earlier, under the drought early warning system, monthly monitoring provides 
primary data on food production, price and market situation, human and animal health, and onset 
and distribution of rain at the woreda level. In addition there are multiple seasonal assessment 
exercises for verification. In addition, several NGOs have their own early warning mechanisms, with 
different types of data collected as a ‘by-product’ of the field monitoring of their regular 
programme operations. The following table provides an example of the successive levels of 
assessments and related activities that took place in Borena zone (Oromiya Region) and Leban zone 
(Somali Region) during the early stages of the 2005/06 drought. CARE is an international NGO. 
 
 
Table 3: The successive levels of assessments and related activities 
Week 1 CARE monthly drought monitoring report triggers the convening of the Emergency 
Coordination Meeting 
Week 2 A rapid assessment is undertaken, led by government zonal authorities  
Week 3 Assessment report discussed at the Emergency Coordination Meeting 
Week 4 Report forwarded to Oromiya Regional Government for discussion 
Week 5 Oromiya regional government discusses report and forwards to the federal 
government 
Weeks 1–5 CARE and others undertake a nutritional survey in affected areas 
Week 6 CARE presents the nutritional survey report to the Emergency Coordination Meeting. 
Federal and the regional authorities hold consultations with the zonal team 
Week 7 The federal and regional governments assemble an assessment team to visit the 
field. This assessment team is joined by the zonal team? who are 
Week 8 The Federal and Regional Assessment teams provides feedback to the Zonal 
Coordination Meeting 
Week 9 Assessment report submitted to the federal government and discussed 
Week 10 The federal government issues an appeal and allows response by public zonal, 
regional and federal agencies. CARE had begun water trucking for domestic use 
before the launching of the government appeal and the declaration of emergency. 
Woreda officials were also undertaking water trucking. Under normal circumstances 
NGOs must wait for a federal declaration and appeal before they can intervene. 
 
Source: Pantuliano and Wekesa (2008) 
 
2.3.4 Responses to the 2005/06 drought 
 
Responses to the drought included both life-saving and livelihood support-based interventions, 
although overall the majority of resources went to food aid. Non-food interventions included 
health, nutrition, water and sanitation, and agriculture - including livestock-focused activities.  
 
Livestock-focused initiatives were undertaken on a relatively limited scale and targeted at a few 
woredas. In total it was estimated that some 1.7 million pastoralists were affected by the drought 
and the DPPA estimated that 54 million livestock required emergency and recovery interventions: 
with the exception of vaccination, the livestock interventions described below, however, benefited 
at most a few tens of thousands of households with practical considerations, such as accessibility 
and proximity to paved roads, being amongst the main determinants in being reached. Vaccination 
of livestock against pasteurellosis, blackleg and anthrax, which involved by far the greatest number 
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of livestock, still only covered around 4% of the at-risk population. Livestock-related interventions 
included: 
 
• Commercial destocking: This involved the facilitation by an NGO (Save the Children USA) 
and MOARD of commercial livestock traders to engage with pastoralists. The NGO provided funds 
for an awareness raising campaign targeted at livestock traders and abattoir owners, which 
included radio and television announcements. This campaign resulted in 40 or so traders 
attending a meeting held in mid-January 2006. As a direct result, 21 of the traders travelled to 
Somalia Region State in early February in transport provided by the NGO. Ultimately, however, 
just two traders went on to purchase cattle. Thin cattle were bought by the traders using their 
own money, although this was done before the condition of the cattle had deteriorated too 
much due to the drought. The cattle were transported out of the drought area, fattened and 
subsequently exported as beef to Egypt. This activity was undertaken in the Moyale woreda of 
Oromiya region. In total an estimated 20,000 cattle were purchased by the two traders for a 
total of US$ 1.01 million: 5400 households benefited by, on average, US$ 186 per household. 
This is equivalent to an average of just US$ 50 per head of cattle purchased, which would 
appear to be a highly discounted price. 
 
• Slaughter destocking: Various NGOs also undertook slaughter destocking operations, in which 
cattle were purchased, slaughtered and processed into dry meat which was distributed to 
vulnerable households. In Dire woreda, Borana Zone, a destocking initiative involved the 
slaughter of 2411 animals from 1121 households, with 2814 kg of dried meat being distributed to 
1301 households.  
 
• In total, through both commercial and NGO-implemented slaughter destocking (see above), one 
estimate suggests that up to 75,000 cattle were destocked although precise figures are lacking. 
 
• Supplementary feeding: Various initiatives targeted the feeding of breeding animals (cattle or 
goats) with hay, straw or concentrates, combined with provision of water, deworming and 
other veterinary treatments and vaccinations. For example, in parts of Dire woreda, Borana 
Zone, supplementary feeding was undertaken for 10,763 animals with 18,126 bales of hay or 
teff straw.  A financial cost-benefit study of one intervention, in which cattle from 800 
households in Zone 4 of Afar region were fed for two months with concentrates, showed that 
the supplementary feeding programme was more than five-times less expensive than allowing 
the animals to die and then undertaking restocking. In a similar intervention targeted at goats, 
2300 households in Zone 1 of Afar region were covered. 
 
• Livestock treatment and vaccination: In addition to the treatments and vaccinations 
administered as a component of the above mentioned supplementary feeding programmes, up 
to 2 million animals were vaccinated in Borana zone using FAO funds. For example, in an 
initiative in parts of Dire woreda, Borana Zone, livestock from 10,763 households were covered 
by vaccination, spraying, deworming and treatment of their livestock. 
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Table 4: Sequence of events in the 2005/06 drought 
Date Events with a focus on livestock interventions 
On-going Each woreda develops drought contingency plans 
Mid-March to end May 2005 Gena rains below average 
July 2005 First signs of drought in Borana Zone  
August 2005 First early warning of drought 
Water trucking started in some locations 
Mid-September to mid-
November 2005 
Hageya rains fail 
October 2005 Pastoralist Livelihood Initiative (PLI) funded by USAID as a 
drought mitigation and preparedness programme 
Save the Children US field staff reported the onset of drought 
November  DPPA Crop and Needs Assessment: indicated 1.5M people will 
need food aid; 0.6M in acute water shortage  
Livestock start to die in Moyale woreda 
December UNICEF begin to prepare Regional Multisectoral Response Plan 
First emergency meeting at Regional Presidency 
Dams in Moyale woreda completely dry 
NGOs launch initial emergency livestock interventions 
31 December 2005 Kenyan Government declare drought a national disaster 
November 2005 through to 
February 2006 
Interventions, including livestock health, initiated by agencies 
which were not dependent upon the humanitarian appeal and 
which could access funding through alternative mechanisms 
Mid December  Save the Children US undertook drought assessments in Liben 
and Afder Zones in the Somali Region: concluded that Moyale 
District was in the alert phase of the drought cycle and without 
rain or appropriate intervention, could move to the alarm 
phase within the following four to six weeks 
Pastoralists employing drought coping strategies, including 
movement of livestock to Hudet and Filtu where slightly better 
deyr rains and pasture were recorded 
December 2005 to March 2006 Key interventions conducted in southern areas of Somali region 
and Borena zone of Oromiya Region: vaccination of up to 2 
million animals and destocking of approximately 75,000 head 
of livestock 
17 January 2006 Awareness-raising meeting for livestock traders: number of 
traders expressed an interest in travelling to the drought-
affected areas to explore the possibility of purchasing drought-
affected livestock 
23 January 2006 GoE emergency international appeal launched 
January 2006 Large numbers of cattle die in Moyale woreda 
January/February 2006 Multi-agency assessment 
Late January/early February 
2006 
PLI partners established a Commercial De-stocking Working 
Group 
Draft Modalities of the Provision of Short-Term Loans to 
Livestock Traders prepared and circulated by PLI 
February Commercial destocking undertaken in Moyale’s two districts 
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Date Events with a focus on livestock interventions 
(Oromiya and Somali) 
Pastoralists in Moyale move some of their animals to other 
places 
Livestock feed supplement programme started by NGOs CARE 
and GAYO 
15 February 2006 FAO appeals for US$ 18.5 million for livestock and agricultural 
assistance throughout country 
9 March UN agencies agree on division of the first US$ 10m tranche of 
CERF funds (for the Horn of Africa): majority earmarked for 
health and nutrition, water and sanitation, and livestock 
16 March Appeal by Kjell Magne Bondevik, the UN Special Humanitarian 
Envoy for the Horn of Africa 
March Showers occur in Oromiya region 
Destocking programme stopped 
End March 2006 Humanitarian Response Fund (HRF) established  
April Gu rains begin in Somali Region 
Migrated livestock return 
Emergency livestock vaccination and treatment started in Dire 
woreda 
May 2006 Dry meat distributed in Dire woreda 
Late September 2006 HRF had disbursed US$ 6.6 million since established in March 
 
2.3.5 External support to the Ethiopian government 
 
A variety of sources and instruments were utilized to fund the emergency response activities. The 
JHA was launched in late January 2006. In total the appeal was for US$ 166 million, made up of US$ 
55 million for food aid and US$ 111 million for non-food aid (health, and nutrition, water and 
sanitation, and agriculture including livestock). The relatively low proportional share for food aid 
was due to a combination of a large carryover from 2005 of food stocks and pledges, and the 
establishment in 2005 of the PSNP. The actual donor response to the appeal, however, resulted in a 
significant shortfall, with just US$ 38.5 million being realized for food aid and US$ 36.6 million for 
non-food aid. The FAO’s component of the JHA included US$ 2 million for emergency livestock 
health interventions and US$ 1 million for destocking activities. 
 
Four sources of funding were of particular importance to livestock-focused interventions. The 
Pastoralist Livelihood Initiative (PLI), a two-year long USAID-funded drought mitigation and 
preparedness project, was established in October 2005, together with funds held by FAO from the 
Belgian Government, and this provided an opportunity to test livelihood-based relief opportunities, 
including livestock-oriented ones. In addition, some NGOs utilized their own funding to enable 
timely implementation of initiatives including destocking and provision of supplementary livestock 
feed. Finally, use of the expanded Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) saw the UN agencies 
share US$ 10 million of CERF funds on 9th March, with the majority earmarked for health and 
nutrition, water and sanitation and livestock interventions, and minimal support (US$ 250,000) for 
food assistance. 
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2.3.6 The drought response unraveled 
 
The major actors involved in the emergency drought response were the Ethiopian Government at 
the various levels, from the most local, woreda, through zonal, regional and federal, to national; 
international NGOs based in Ethiopia; UN organizations; the Ethiopian private sector; and the 
pastoralist communities in the drought affected areas.  
 
Ethiopia’s federal system, where policy and decision-making powers are devolved to the 
autonomous states, makes it difficult to have a coordinated national response. As a result there 
was no national-level contingency plan or funding system, and while there were contingency plans 
and funding arrangements in place at local and federal levels, these were not coordinated and 
there was no overall coherent approach. As part of the drought preparedness policy the woredas 
are expected to develop their own contingency plans but they largely lack the capacity to do so.  
 
The government institution responsible for emergency drought response in Ethiopia has changed 
several times since new policies were put in place in 1993, which in turn were a response to the 
devastating droughts and associated famines of the 1980s. The latest changes, which are intended 
to direct more attention to tackling the chronic causes of food insecurity, were in the process of 
being introduced as the 2005/06 drought took hold, but at that time had not been implemented in 
the pastoralist areas that were worst affected. The private sector in Ethiopia is relatively poorly 
developed and Ethiopia is regarded as a difficult place to do business, ranking 107th out of 184 
countries listed in the World Bank’s Ease of Doing Business rankings for 2009. Although reforms 
aimed at transforming Ethiopia from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one were 
launched in 1991, after the overthrow of the former pro-Soviet Derg regime, the potential 
contributions of industry and the private sector remain largely untapped. 
 
As the drought began to unfold there were a number of monitoring and early warning systems in 
operation. The official system, implemented by the DDPA, required information to flow from the 
most local level, woreda, up through the various tiers of government, eventually reaching the 
national level. The DPPA early warning system is often constrained by inadequate resources, in 
which case NGOs try to step in to fill the gap. And NGOs and international organizations also carry 
out their own regular, independent assessments as part of the on-going monitoring of their 
interventions and development programmes. During the 2005/06 drought there seemed to be clear 
duplication of effort: federal and regional government repeated and verified assessments already 
undertaken by zonal governments or NGOs, delaying decision-making and timely response. The 
reasons for this seems to be lack of trust between the tiers of government, and also between 
government and NGOs, lack of coordination between the various players, and a general lack of 
confidence by government in data collected in the field. Marginalization of pastoralist communities 
and their lack of influence in government and political power are also likely to be important 
contributory factors. And despite all this emphasis on, and investment in, monitoring and early 
warning, in the 2005/06 drought this failed to translate into timely action, especially for livestock-
based interventions, some of which were only beginning to take off as the rains returned. 
 
Most emergency interventions consisted of food relief, with only limited livelihood-based 
interventions. Assessing emergency non-food needs is considerably more difficult than assessing 
food needs and is a relatively new and emerging approach that requires new and different skills 
which are generally lacking, especially at the more local levels to which responsibilities tend to be 
devolved.  
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Despite the first signs of drought being apparent and flagged up in July 2005, interventions in 
general and the livelihood-based interventions in particular – including destocking and feeding of 
livestock- were generally late: the first externally implemented, livestock-oriented interventions 
occurred in November with most not happening until 2006. Reasons for the tardiness of response, in 
addition to the lack of capacity noted above, included inflexibility and unresponsiveness of 
procurement procedures, and poor coordination, especially amongst NGOs. In addition there was a 
lack of policy, institutions and legislation to support timely delivery of livelihood-based 
interventions, and a systematic failure to facilitate the sharing of ideas and experiences and in 
doing so create the framework conditions needed to mobilise knowledge to meet the diverse and 
ever-changing needs of the sector. Exposure to the knowledge and experience of others can help 
organizations and policy makers translate principles into operational strategies relevant to their 
own contexts. 
 
During the 2005/06 drought various livestock-oriented interventions took place, although their scale 
and area of impact was relatively limited. A significant source of the funding for them came from a 
short duration, donor-funded project which, by chance, was just being established as the drought 
took hold. Fortunately this project was able to be sufficiently flexible to allow a change of a 
direction which created the ‘space’ for some of the livestock-oriented emergency interventions to 
take place; however, this source of funding will be not be available next time a drought occurs, and 
so is not part of a sustainable solution. Although many of these livestock-based interventions could 
be viewed as pilots, it is difficult to see how most could be significantly scaled up. In addition, 
given that these initiatives were not set up in way that would enable rigorous evaluation and 
learning – both at the practice and policy level- there is a risk that the same mistakes will be made 
next time around.  
 
The campaign to create awareness of the opportunity for commercial destocking, promoted by the 
NGO Save the Children US, initially attracted the interest of around 40 livestock traders, but of 
these just two eventually purchased cattle from pastoralists and the activity was focused in only a 
few locations close to main roads. Traders were aware that roads in the more remote areas were in 
poor conditions and they knew that transporters would charge more to operate in these areas; in 
any case the two traders involved could buy the relatively small number of cattle they needed from 
the more accessible areas and so had no reason or incentive to travel further into the hinterland. 
The poor state of roads in the more remote pastoralist areas – a glaring indicator of the 
marginalization of pastoralist areas in Ethiopia - is clearly a major impediment to larger scale or 
more widespread commercial destocking; it has been reported that Ethiopia has the lowest road 
density per capita in the world. The pastoralists were initially sceptical that the traders would buy 
their thin cattle, but once they had witnessed this happening they soon realized that this was an 
opportunity to sell cattle in poor condition that, as the drought progressed, were likely to die, and 
to use the money obtained to buy food for their families, feed for their remaining core livestock, 
pay for veterinary services or purchase more drought-tolerant sheep and goats in place of cattle.  
 
Many pastoralists lacked confidence in dealing with livestock traders and were unaware of what 
constituted a fair price. They therefore relied on trusted and more market-savvy fellow pastoralists 
to negotiate with the traders on their behalf. This system also suited the traders as they were able 
to purchase large batches of cattle in single transactions. During the commercial destocking 
initiative cattle were not sold in a conventional livestock market setting: with just two buyers the 
usual competitive marketing system clearly could not operate. However, surprisingly, it was 
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reported that although prices paid varied widely and in some cases these were below ‘normal’ 
market prices, in other cases relatively high prices were paid for the thin cattle with these prices 
apparently driven by the strong Egyptian export market for beef. With the emergency slaughter 
initiative, in which a number of NGOs purchased thin cattle, slaughtered them, dried the meat and 
distributed this to vulnerable local households, the scale of operation was even smaller than the 
commercial destocking operation. Traditionally, Borana pastoralists avoid eating meat from 
emaciated animals and there was a widely held preconception that the dried meat would not be 
culturally acceptable. However, the pastoralists who received dried meat reported that they liked 
the taste, indeed that it represented an improvement on their normal, rather bland maize-based 
diets. In a study undertaken in Dire woreda it was found that dried meat made up almost a quarter 
of the household food of beneficiaries. It was even reported that although the NGOs targeted the 
most needy households (as judged by local people), even the better-off households appreciated the 
dried meat and, in keeping with traditional practice, the meat was shared throughout the entire 
community. The combined impact of the two destocking schemes was highly localized and overall 
benefited less than 2% of the total number of pastoralist households affected by the drought. 
Despite the small scale, those pastoralists who did benefit reported that they considered the 
destocking interventions as amongst the most innovative and beneficial of all interventions, 
although they would have preferred that they had occurred earlier in the drought cycle. Provision 
of livestock feed by external agencies, whether as dried grass, teff straw or concentrate feed, was 
also highly appreciated by the pastoralists, although again this activity began too late and occurred 
on a relatively small scale. Clearly the greatest need for such emergency feeds will occur during 
the most severe droughts when supplies will be most restricted and, as in the commercial 
destocking intervention, the poor state of feeder roads in the more remote rural areas will act as a 
major barrier. 
 
The largest scale livestock-based emergency drought intervention, vaccination, still only involved 
less than 4% of the livestock population thought to be affected by the drought, and the 
appropriateness of this intervention is questionable. The vaccines used in 2005/06 were against the 
diseases pasteurellosis, blackleg and anthrax. A recent study (Feinstein International Centre 2007) 
of the impact of vaccination of livestock in droughts in Ethiopia concluded that during drought 
years there was no significant difference in livestock mortality, for any species, in vaccinated 
compared with non-vaccinated herds. Also, the vaccines administered in 2005/06 were not for the 
diseases that pastoralists ranked as most important, nor were they necessarily for the disease that 
veterinary authorities believed caused the highest mortality rates in the targeted areas, which 
tended to be CBPP for cattle and CCPP and PPR for sheep and goats. The study authors concluded 
that while vaccination should be a standard preventive measure during normal years, poorly 
designed and implemented vaccination campaigns undertaken during droughts were of doubtful 
utility. A major driver of livestock vaccination during droughts appears to be that they are a 
relatively cheap and easy intervention to implement rather than any evidence that vaccination at 
this time can reduce mortality. 
 
In addition to the external interventions, pastoralists themselves adopted a number of their own 
coping strategies and implemented these much earlier in the drought cycle than the external ones. 
Key amongst these was moving cattle to areas where water and grazing were more available, 
although this caused problems when pastoralists moved onto land belonging to other clans. In 
addition, on-going insecurity meant that some land that could usefully have been used as dry 
season grazing went unused. Pastoralists suggested that NGOs could work with traditional 
organizations to help overcome such access problems. In addition to trekking animals in the 
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traditional manner, during the 2005/06 drought some pastoralists were innovative and hired 
vehicles to truck breeding animals out of the drought area. Other local innovations observed during 
the drought were for irrigated maize crops to be cut early by agropastoralists for use as 
supplementary livestock feed. Some pastoralists also reported that they would be willing to 
purchase concentrate feed at full market prices to help ensure key breeding animals survived, but 
that such feeds were not available locally (Feinstein International Centre 2007).  
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3. THE WORKSHOPS AND ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
A parallel component of this programme of work consisted of two workshops organized by IGAD–LPI 
in mid 2008. The workshops brought together senior civil servants with responsibility for livestock 
and animal health issues, with parliamentarians, representatives of livestock marketing 
organizations and NGOs from Djibouti, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, Sudan and Uganda, in addition to 
representatives of IGAD-LPI, FAO, Africa Centre for Technology Studies (ACTS), LINK ( Learning, 
Innovation and Knowledge) and donors. The overall objective was to gain a better understanding of 
the types of competencies and skills that contribute to policy-relevant capacity in the region’s 
livestock sectors through sharing knowledge and experience on livestock policy processes. 
 
During the workshops, the participants revisited the World Bank’s basic agricultural innovation 
capacity analytical framework (actors and their roles; patterns of interaction; habits and practices; 
enabling environment) and developed this further by adding sub-headings under the four main 
headings as follows:  
 
Actors and their roles  
- Diversity / relevance of actors involved – stakeholder analysis  
- Power and influence of different actors  
- Roles performed by different actors, evolution of roles;  
- Levels of participation;  
- Presence of initiators  
- Different actors involved in different stages of policy process;  
- Sector coordination;  
- Presence of ‘champions’  
 
Patterns of interactions  
- Dynamic x respond to challenges or opportunity  
- Network of linkages – transparent, evolving, appropriate  
- Frequency of interaction – evolution of interactions  
- Appropriate mechanisms (locations, issues, actors)  
- Platforms  
- Rules of engagement  
- Continuity of engagement; institutionalization of engagement  
 
Habits and practices  
- Processes of interaction  
- Diversity and quality of knowledge sources and pools  
- Information sharing  
- Monitoring and review  
- Learning  
- Quality of interactions  
- Culture, culture of persons as pertains to social interaction and networks  
- Time frame  
- Institutional history/background/baggage  
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Presence or absence of an enabling environment  
- Incentives (both positive and negative)  
- Needs and triggers  
- Context  
- Goodwill / Political will  
- Good governance  
- Anti-corruption  
- Room for arbitration  
- Capacity (competencies, skills, resources, information)  
- Institutional capacity – capacity to participate  
- Social standing / influence of policy champions/advocates 
 
Participants were also introduced to practical approaches that can be used to track change in 
policy processes. The long-term goal is to facilitate changes that make policy processes operate in 
more pro-poor ways – and thus that social and economic outcomes are mediated through the 
process of institutional change. Participants learned, however, that, as there is generally a long 
time lag before tangible social and economic benefits arise that can be assessed, there is a need, in 
the mean time, to monitor and report changes in process. Hence, lessons that emerge from 
interventions with institutional change become key indicators of progress and a qualitative means 
to assess the direction of institutional change (Appendix 2).  
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4. SO WHAT DO THE CASE STUDIES AND THE WORKSHOPS TELL US 
ABOUT BUILDING INNOVATION RESPONSE CAPACITY? 
 
4.1 Results of the Case Studies 
 
The results from the case studies largely endorse the elements identified as essential 
characteristics of innovation response capacity. The analysis during the workshops also highlighted 
additional issues that are of importance, but rather than providing new analytical elements these 
were generally a more detailed sub-set of the main characteristics identified in the conceptual 
framework. In the ‘enabling environment’, some additional features were identified and the 
innovation response capacity conceptual framework has been revisited and revised to reflect this: 
4.2 Actors and their roles 
 
Sector coordination: The case studies revealed a broad array of sector coordination arrangements; 
ranging from its virtual absence to the presence of ‘over’ coordination. In both cases, the speed 
and coherence with which decisions are taken, and appropriate action is implemented, suffers. In 
the few examples where sector coordination was used to broker new relationships, such action 
significantly improved coherence and creativity within the response. However, in many cases, 
coordination was used to control, rather than to facilitate, and as such prevented rather than aided 
the building of innovation response capacity.  
 
In cases where rapid, coherent action ensues or where newly formed coalitions of actors allow new 
practices and approaches to flourish, this is often a result of third-party brokering, rather than 
sector-wide coordination. Whilst such third-party negotiation is often necessary and vital, it is in 
most cases not sufficient to establish the sector-wide coordination needed to generate the required 
trust and social capital through interactions and linkages that change ways of working, or to ensure 
the evolution of the myriad of complementary roles and skills through the cross-fertilization of 
knowledge stocks that contributes to the capacity to innovate.  
 
Sector coordination, however, involves more than just the brokering of the necessary linkages or 
the elimination of obstructions and similar task - now commonly described as innovation brokering. 
It also provides urgency, direction, specificity and identity to a network of actors as it confronts 
particular issues. It thus requires actors that command the sector’s broad trust, have an 
institutional and organisational overview, and skills that can lubricate an appropriate patchwork of 
interaction and competencies. In examples where this has functioned well, such tasks have either 
been fulfilled by a body set up specifically through the concerted actions of a critical mass of 
sector actors, or where such tasks have gravitated organically towards a broadly recognised sector 
champion. Moreover, the two case studies could also clearly benefit from greater regional 
coordination. Thus far the national, regional and international organizations involved have 
glamorously failed to even suggest a hint of moving towards this. 
 
Champions and brokers. Whilst additional issues identified in the workshops were largely 
additional qualifiers, one that does require specific mention is case of ‘champions’. Not only can 
such actors play an important role in sector coordination, advocacy and the championing of new 
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approaches, they are also of vital importance in an innovation brokerage role to actively link 
different actors. In the case of the drought episode, this role was played by some projects and 
NGOs that, albeit on a limited scale, brokered linkages and set up mechanisms for interaction 
between diverse actors. Unfortunately, the ‘project’ manner in which this was operationalised 
largely prevented the building of the appropriate institutional capacity. It did, however, clearly 
indicate the potential that the inclusion of such an innovation brokerage role within the 
institutional architecture could have. 
 
Entrepreneurship: The current ‘emergency industry’ has not been kind to entrepreneurs and 
entrepreneurship in general. The investment ‘climate’ revealed by the case studies clearly shows 
that under the current conditions any signs or budding involvement by entrepreneurs in the sector 
are prevented or destroyed through the wholesale take-over of the sector by both the public and 
tertiary sector, often with the tacit agreement of the donor community, during ‘emergencies’. 
Whilst ‘experiments’ in other developing regions and sectors actively look to stimulate a nascent 
private sector through the strategic allocation of public and/or donor monies, the emergency 
industry in the Horn of Africa is still largely controlled by the public sector. As indicated, civil 
society and donors are often equally guilty of such actions, as their short-term project 
interventions frequently destroys existing or burgeoning systems and linkages. The attempt at 
getting livestock traders involved in the emergency response in Ethiopia was interesting; as in 
general, traders are scared away by the take over of markets during severe droughts by the public 
and tertiary sector. Whilst the ‘experiment’ was relatively small and not necessarily an unqualified 
success, it clearly showed a potential role that for entrepreneurship in emergency responses. It also 
indicated one of the many potential manners in which the public and tertiary sector can facilitate 
and broker private sector involvement, rather than temporarily performing such roles themselves - 
creating and leaving institutional voids, rather than building institutional capacity. 
 
Thus far, the opportunities for the private sector involvement in RVF responses have been relatively 
limited. New technology, however, which permits the combination of various vaccines in one single 
dose, is likely to provide treatment opportunities that will be able to combine public good with 
private interests for private gain. Thus far, however, this remains a distant promise; innovation in 
livestock production, processing, utilisation, and distribution only takes place where different 
players in the sector are well networked together allowing them to make creative use of ideas, 
technologies and information from different sources, including from research. 
 
Providing knowledge of the future: Both episodes studied deal with sophisticated systems 
designed to provide early warning and, essentially, in both cases such early warning was indeed 
provided. The analyses also clearly indicate, however, that the value of such knowledge of the 
future, without being anchored to field realities and response capacities, is esoteric: In neither 
case did it assist the timeliness, or local specificity of the eventual response, nor did it contribute 
significantly to the building of the required capacity.  
 
Research: Whilst it is true that not all innovation requires research, it is also clear that a 
technological breakthrough in terms of a longer-lasting or ‘cocktail’ vaccination would potentially 
provide additional options in dealing with RVF. Whilst, as indicated, some moves are being made in 
that direction, in the absence of concomitant changes, such technological breakthroughs are 
unlikely to provide the social and economical impacts sought. 
Systems changes cannot be adopted by individuals; rather they have to be agreed and delivered, by 
definition, by the broad network of players involved in turning inventions into innovation. 
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Public research on weather related ‘emergencies’, both national and international, has thus far 
largely preoccupied itself with early warning and emergency food aid distribution. Whilst there 
have been some attempts to move beyond this, in general research and research thinking around 
these areas is still firmly stuck in the old paradigm, often generously incentified through specific 
research investments for those topics.  
 
Service provision: In geographically remote areas, where services are basic at best, expectations in 
respect of their contribution to innovation responsive capacity should be similarly basic. Even the 
oft touted veterinary services are little exception to this rule. Whilst undoubtedly necessary, in the 
absence of a broader interpretation of service provision, and with the recurrent lack of the 
integration of community-based services with actors higher up the veterinary chain of command, 
they contribute little to innovation and innovation response capacity. So, whilst officially accepted, 
some of the findings in these studies suggest that their continuing tacit rejection and lack of 
integration may actually be contributing to the worsening of surveillance and response capacity. 
 
Ensuring socially desirable outcomes: Ensuring socially desirable outcomes have become an 
important international political currency. The thinking in relation to this in respect of 
‘emergencies’, however, has evolved little beyond rescue and relief. In other words, the one 
socially desirable outcome pursued is the absence and prevention of death. Whilst clearly 
understandable from a humanitarian point of view, this limited interpretation also obviously entails 
that long-term socially desirable outcomes will only be achieved if the underlying thinking that 
currently drives behaviour in the aid and emergency sector changes. Moreover, such limited views, 
and the concomitant actions such as settlement and the creation of economic dependence, have 
often shown to be instrumental in perpetuating social inequities and play into the hands of a 
political agenda which looks to better control peripatetic social groupings. 
 
4.3 Patterns of interaction 
 
Links to consumers: Although often maligned, there are few doubts that traders (buyers) or 
middlemen are a critical source of information on the changing preferences in distant markets. 
They are also an integral part of the intricate network of interactions among actors essential to the 
functioning of pastoral systems and the maintenance of trade links between the Horn and the 
Arabian peninsular. Whilst such linkages have proven to be resilient and can be reconfigured 
relatively quickly, the interventionist nature of the measures taken during livestock sector-related 
‘emergencies’, has thus far generally prevented the amalgamation of existing networks and the 
strengthening of available capacity through the exploitation of potential synergies. 
 
Links to specialist technical knowledge: Changing conditions often require responses through the 
upgrading of technology, capacities and systems. Although the studies revealed some evidence of 
‘upgrading’, ‘mainstream’ technical knowledge has thus far not been able to fruitfully engage, or 
link in an operationally sensible manner, to these processes. This is not only the result of the 
marginalization of sector actors in the generation of appropriate knowledge, but it is also 
reinforced through the lack of recognition that fundamental changes have taken place which 
represent a new normality, and that significant revision of the paradigms that have, thus far, 
dominated sector thinking is required. 
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Mechanisms that facilitate interaction: There appear to have been few real attempts at setting up 
mechanisms that could knit an innovation fabric amenable to rapid reconfiguration. In the limited 
‘experimentation’ with such mechanisms that was observed in the case studies, there were signs 
that this indeed aided reconfiguration of patterns of interaction. Unfortunately, ‘membership’ in 
such experiments was rather limited and focussed predominantly on satisfying the immediate needs 
of pastoralists, rather than also attempt to provide a degree of systemic coherence and interaction. 
Moreover, the mechanisms were set up in a ‘project’ way; rather than building institutional 
capacity they just filled institutional gaps for a limited period. Limited as the experiences gained 
may be, thus far it is clear that mechanisms which facilitate linkages between diverse sector actors 
and knowledge stocks can be instrumental in enhancing the timeliness and appropriateness of 
responses. 
4.4 Habits and practices 
 
Attitudes towards change: Public, private and tertiary sector organizations exhibit varying degrees 
of reluctance to change. Although this is generally believed to be most marked in public sector 
organisations, the case studies revealed many of the same characteristic in civil society 
organizations. With vested interests continuing to be shored up by an ample flow of donor funding – 
apparently oblivious to their gate keeper role in this respect - progress in these areas will remain 
slow as there is no real incentive for any of the ‘emergency’ industry actors to reflect, share turf, 
engage in debate, or to change behaviour.  
 
Trust: Whilst a cursory look at the relationships between the parties involved in ‘emergency’ 
responses may suggest a willingness to cooperate, evidence form the case studies suggest 
differently. Collaboration and coordination generally does not stretch beyond the partition and 
allocation of geographical areas to specific organizations. The glaring lack of trust revealed by the 
studies, however, is best illustrated by a general ‘we’ll have to see for ourselves’ attitude, rather 
than to accept opinions, assessments and diagnoses by other actors. 
 
Shared identity: Much as in the case of trust, it is clear from the studies that in most cases there 
does not seem to be enough social capital among actors to be speaking of a shared identity that 
would aid coherence and responsiveness. And whilst there may be degrees of shared identity among 
some of the same actor groupings, even here the case studies reveal more incidences of turf 
protection rather than a shared sense of purpose. It is also clear from the studies, however, that 
when this is achieved, even in small measures, it greatly aids the potential to find creative and 
sensible solutions, often to long-standing problems. 
 
Learningness: In the case of the drought case study there appear to be mechanisms that could aid 
learning; there is, however, limited actual evidence of any learning occurring. This should not come 
as a surprise, as it is largely a reflection of the observed relationships among sector actors. 
Moreover, recent ‘experiments’ that broke the ‘rescue and relief’ mould, whilst clearly showing 
potential, have, thus far, been too limited in nature and scope to have a significant impact on the 
emergency industry. It is also undoubtedly true that there is intrinsic learning within staff. It is 
unclear, however, to what extent such tacit knowledge is retained due to the relatively high 
turnover of personnel and organisations.  
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National culture: Whilst it is not useful to engage in a discussion as to whether certain cultural 
traits are constraints to innovation and innovation responsiveness, it is, at the same time, 
important to point out that prevailing opinions among governments and non-pastoralist society, 
coupled with the geographical remoteness and poor access to infrastructure and services, add to 
the political and social marginalisation of the areas and its inhabitants.  
 
4.5 Enabling environment 
 
Clearly the enabling environment, or rather the absence of an enabling environment, manifests 
itself through the factors already discussed. The two cases clearly indicate that existing policy 
frameworks, respective responsibilities of ministry and governance arrangements of the sector are 
hardly helpful. However, rather than measures being taken to remediate these issues, there 
appears to be indication that many of these barriers are actively kept in place, or strengthened for 
social and political reasons.  
 
In the concomitant absence of incentives for change, and in the continuing reluctance of donors 
and civil society to fulfil part of their responsibility as gate keepers, it is hard to see how the wider 
set of policies and institutions in which the innovation process is situated will contribute to the 
capacity to innovate and innovation responsiveness. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
50 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
5.1 Where to Start: The 4cs that build Innovation Response Capacity 
 
With the case studies confirming the specific analytical elements that can be used to explore 
innovation response capacity, it is probably useful to explore the implications of how one could 
best start to think about building this capacity and the indicative actions that investment in such 
capacity should be directed towards. 
 
Comprehensiveness 
 
Wide-ranging perspectives assist sectors and countries to deal with the challenges and demands of 
today’s changing world. Such viewpoints not only promote inclusiveness, systemic sector 
understanding – including links with other sectors and the wider economy - and interaction between 
diverse actors, it also instils an understanding that interventions need to have a long-term 
perspective and give sufficient emphasis to facilitating an experienced-based, incremental process 
that develops sector capacity. 
 
Generally, neither the evolving set of opportunities presented to, nor the problems faced by, a 
sector can be exploited or solved by just one actor or actor group. Diverse actors, skills, 
technologies, operating environments, knowledge stocks and approaches will be required. Sector 
innovation requires new ‘hardware’, ‘software’ and social arrangement at multiple levels. This is 
not to say that continuous involvement by all actors is required. Whilst it is important that all 
opinions, voices – particularly those of the poor - and walks of life are included and connected 
through a loose network of linkages which can be easily reactivated, involvement at specific times 
in different innovation trajectories will have to evolve according to needs and approaches. 
Similarly, it does not mean that all ‘solutions’ have to be found at the same time, but that the 
outlook has to be sufficiently articulated and complete to allow the brokering of rapid responses 
and adaptations to services, products and production arrangements as society’s social, economic 
and environmental goals evolve. In the absence of this ‘comprehensiveness’, innovation response 
capacity is unlikely to flourish. 
 
Indicative activities that can contribute to and stimulate the creation of such capacities include, 
among others, interventions that increase the degree of organization of specific actor groups; 
interventions that build capacity for groups to participate in policy and practice processes and 
dialogues; regular, broadly shared sector reviews and analyses; the establishment of sector 
foresight mechanisms; and policy and financial incentives that stimulate cross-sectoral working 
arrangements and the exchange of information.  
 
Coherence 
 
Whilst working together is essential, it requires actors to do so in ways that allows them to actively 
identify complementarities and to exploit synergies. It calls for sensitivity on the part of the actors 
to recognize hiatus or failings and the identification of the competencies and skills that are lacking. 
Networks of interacting elements have properties which are more than the sum of the constituent 
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parts and which cannot be accounted for by analysis of individual elements of the system. It is for 
this reason that ways of working assume such significance as this determines how the system 
operates. True partnership relationships are based on systemic necessity, rather than on vested 
interests, and occur only in situations where learning and reflection are an integral part of 
management arrangements and where corrective action as a result of such reflection is immediate 
and effective. 
 
Similarly, coordination involves more than just the brokering of the necessary contacts or the 
elimination of obstructions and similar task. It also provides urgency, direction, specificity and 
identity to a network of actors as it confronts particular issues. It requires actors that command the 
sector’s broad trust, the institutional and organisational overview, and skills that can lubricate an 
appropriate patchwork of interaction and competencies. In examples where this has functioned 
well, such tasks have either been fulfilled by a body set up specifically through the concerted 
actions of a critical mass of sector actors, or where such tasks have gravitated organically towards 
a broadly recognised sector champion. In the absence of this ‘coherence’ innovation response 
capacity is unlikely to flourish 
 
Indicative activities that can contribute to and stimulate the creation of such capacities, among 
others, include the organisation of regular, sector-wide consultative meetings, which may require 
facilitation initially; the creation of a sector coordination body/association; financing and 
establishment of sector brokering agents; policy and financial incentives schemes for sector 
collaboration and joint programming; and regular, broadly shared sector reviews and analyses.  
 
Clarity 
 
Information sharing and openness in decision-making greatly aids learning. The associated 
exchanges also foster the recognition and integration of both the diverse and shared actor 
objectives that the sector needs to satisfy and generate the acknowledgement of specific rights and 
responsibilities. The trust created through such interaction is an essential ingredient in the 
relationships needed to underpin innovation: Responsiveness to rapidly changing conditions requires 
a sufficient degree of transparency among sector actors to ease the creation of new, or the 
rekindling of old, links. In the absence of this ‘clarity’, innovation response capacity is unlikely to 
flourish. 
 
Indicative activities that can contribute to and stimulate the creation of such capacities include, 
among others, sector-wide programming and visioning exercises; negotiation and advocacy skill 
acquisition; sector transparency policy and financial incentive schemes; and inter-sectoral 
placement and employment schemes. 
 
Creativity 
 
Seizing opportunities, taking risks and solving existing or emergent problems are essential for any 
sector to compete, cope and prosper in today’s dynamic rural development scenario.   If such 
capacities are not well developed, responses to opportunities and challenges will be lacking or, at 
best, weak. This role is generally recognised to be best suited to private sector operators. 
Nevertheless, when entrepreneurship is not uniformly developed across all sectors, it is important 
that such institutional hiatus are filled – even if temporarily - by the public or tertiary sector whilst 
remedial action to stimulate private/financial incentive is taken.  
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Foresight mechanisms and close linkages beyond the immediate sector and national boundaries can 
assist in the early recognition and action to anticipate social, economic, technical and 
environmental sector trends and policies. Such mechanisms are particularly relevant in an 
environment were experimentation and sector evolution is actively encouraged.   
 
In the absence of this ‘creativity’, innovation response capacity is unlikely to flourish. 
 
Indicative activities that can contribute to and stimulate the creation of such capacities include, 
among others, policy and financial incentives for flexible, embedded and service-oriented research 
capacity; creation of foresight processes and mechanisms; policy and financial incentives for 
entrepreneurship including social venture capital, and public, private tertiary sector partnerships; 
international sector ‘twinning’ and membership of international sector associations; and the 
organisation and participation of international sector visits and trade fairs. 
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APPENDIX: A BRIEF OPERATIONAL GUIDE TO PROCESS MONITORING 
 
Why we need process monitoring 
The purpose of many research and development (R&D) projects in the past years have undergone a 
clear shift from direct impacts on poor people only, to the facilitation of changes that make 
processes operate in more pro-poor ways – thus recognizing that social and economic outcomes are 
mediated through the process of institutional change.  
Since there is generally a long lag-time before tangible benefits arise that can be assessed, there is 
a need to monitor and report changes in process. Thus, lessons that emerge from interventions with 
institutional change become a key indicator of progress and a qualitative means to assess the 
direction of institutional change. If impact is increasingly about institutional change, as is our main 
argument here, one needs to be far more serious about how such change is monitored - and thus 
expand the perspective of normal M&E and impact assessments - which grossly underestimate 
change because it views this in terms of short-term tangible economic terms, only. 
The identification of some typologies of desirable institutional change and institutional change 
trajectories -although others may emerge- allows, the monitoring of such trajectories over time 
through methodologies such as stages of progress/monitoring domains, socio-economic 
benchmarking, episode analyses, thus providing the multiple sources and types of information that 
would build up plausible connections between particular types of institutional change and socially 
desirable outcomes.  
The emphasis of such activities require an action research / action development orientation and 
the need to think about progressive change in these processes, where the different progressive 
stages need to be defined and redefined throughout the project. The tool of choice in this case is 
the stages of progress / monitoring domains approach. 
Process monitoring – instructions for use 
R&D processes are generally to complex to monitor or analyse in their entirety to obtain any 
meaningful and useable results, it is thus proposed to break up the processes that are being 
addressed into a number of distinct monitoring domains. In each domain, essential questions are 
asked that will need to be revisited as projects and processes evolve.  
To achieve this, LINK proposes experimentation with two simple approaches which are explained in 
detail below: 
The ‘artisanal’ approach 
Step: Baseline brainstorm 
To initiate this approach, a meeting needs to be organised that brings together partners and other 
key stakeholders, to agree on a baseline situation in respect of the R&D process concerned, as it is 
conventionally organised. To make such an initial step really effective, we suggest that users of the 
approach and their partners facilitate a brainstorm on this. Some of the current state 
characteristics that can result from such a brainstorm may, for example, include the following: 
(i) Roles of various actors are fixed. Limited scope for new actors to join, be included, or play 
new roles; 
(ii) Institutional arrangements, nature of relationships and political economy issues not examined 
and reported on. No incentives for institutional learning and change; 
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(iii) Definition of the problem(s) and solution(s) to be evaluated, defined by limited set of actors. 
Limited consultation and / or participation by other stakeholders; 
(iv) etc. 
 
 
Step: Stages of progress 
Following agreement on the current state characteristics, the project/meeting can move to 
brainstorm about what the future vision for each of the agreed characteristic of the current policy 
process would be. Once agreement has been reached on this vision of the future, intermediate 
progressive stages need to be identified and agreed. Next, the critical questions that will have to 
be asked to be able to assess progress through its progressive stages from each of the identified 
baseline characteristics to its future vision need to be enumerated. The outcome of such a 
brainstorming session, in respect of the current state characteristic identified during the baseline 
step, may look something like the following examples: 
(i) Roles and involvement of actors 
- Future vision: Roles and involvement of various actors evolve according to the needs of the 
policy process and in accordance with the capacity of actors to perform specific functions 
- Progressive change stages e.g.: 
Set and fixed   Decided in consultation  Iterative/evolving -----------
--------------------------------------------------------------? 
Progressive change 
- Indicative questions e.g.: Are ‘new’ actors performing roles traditionally performed by others? 
Are different actors performing multiple or new roles? Who? In which specific activities? How do 
these changes manifest themselves?  
 
(ii) Nature of relationships and linkages. 
- Future vision: Relationships and patterns of interaction among sector actors in the policy 
process are efficient, effective and respectful and conducive to sharing of experiences and 
institutional change.  
- Progressive change stages e.g.: 
One dominant member  Joint implementation   Joint responsibility 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
Progressive change 
- Indicative questions e.g.:  What are the key relationships in the programme/project?  What do 
individual partners think about these relationships?  Are these relationships and the rules that 
govern them evolving? How do such changes manifest themselves? 
(iii) Process management and structures by specific activity.  
- Future vision: The policy process and related activities are managed by consensus by a broad 
range of key stakeholders. 
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Progressive change stages e.g.: 
Use of sanctions   Powers of veto    By consensus 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------? 
Progressive change 
- Indicative questions e.g.: How are decisions on different activities reached? Who is consulted? 
Who participates? 
Step: Assessment and adjustment 
The action research orientation that lies at the basis of this process monitoring approach, in 
practice means that the results from this continuous assessment drive the adjustment of project 
activities and the revision and redefinition of the essential questions as the process evolves and 
institutional learning and change proceeds. The approach thus contributes to integrating learning 
into livestock sector policy formulation and to devising interventions where the links between 
operational activities and R&D processes are explicit and where discovering how best to deal with 
new challenges is a common task that connects development interventions and relevant areas of 
policy making.  
In the setting of a specific programme or project, this assessment and adjustment process can be 
facilitated as an central part of regular workshops/meetings, and basically involves repeating the 
previously described steps to assess movement on the ’progressive change’ trajectories and to 
revisit and adjust, if necessary, the essential questions that are asked to assess process evolution.  
The ‘flat-pack’ approach 
Prefab process monitoring 
As the name implies, this approach makes use of pre-prepared standard monitoring domains that 
encapsulate the 4 pillars of the innovation systems analytical framework (World Bank, 2006) and 
can be extended for any of the specific objectives of the project or programme. Assessments are 
made through the use of standard critical questions for each domain, and a standardized 
progressive change barometer which allows process evolution in each domain to be assessed. The 
proposed monitoring domains are as follows: 
• Role of different actors 
• Patterns of interaction 
• Quality of interactions 
• Enabling environment 
• Poverty relevance 
 
The power of process monitoring lies, as mentioned earlier, in the promotion of iterative learning 
and subsequent change among diverse stakeholders and the explicit linking of R&D processes to 
operational activities and impact. Whilst the attached prefab sheets should thus be used in that 
manner, they can, in principle, also be used in smaller groups or by individuals. If used in that way, 
the assessment should still form the basis for interaction among different stakeholders during 
workshops, or serve as a focus for discussions in programme related dialogues. 
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Instructions for use 
Step: Answering critical questions per domain 
Each domain sheet contains three critical questions to be ‘answered’. Following the careful 
evaluation of each of these questions, the domain’s progressive change barometer allows the 
current ‘situation’ in each of the domain to be indicated. At the same time, important comments 
and observations can be noted down on the sheets as well [and additional paper if required...]. As 
described in Approach A, under Step: Assessment and adjustment, the use of this approach should 
ideally be facilitated as an integral part of the programme’s / project’s regular workshops and 
meetings, - and provide the basis from which to adjust and devise project activities- and basically 
involves a repeat of the described steps to assess movement on the ’progressive change’ 
trajectories and to revisit and adjust, if necessary, the essential questions that are asked to assess 
process evolution.  
The following page shows a brief example of ‘used’ prefab process monitoring sheets. The pages 
thereafter provide potential users with ‘clean’ prefab sheets for their own use: 
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Domain: Role of different actors 
 
Date:     17 January 2009 
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Actors’ roles are fixed and not challenged    x  
New and diverse actors become involved as needs dictate x     
Process is actively coordinated and facilitated  x    
 
The progressive change barometer     x                          
                              set and fixed                                                   decided in consultation                                         iterative/evolving 
 
Comments/observations:  The key relationships in the project are largely ‘old’ relationships and there is little evolution in rules and practices.  Most project partners are 
resigned to their tasks in light of history rather than in light of needs and current capacity. Erosion of influence and introduction of new partners is strongly resisted by 
some key stakeholders.  Partners not treated or regarded as equals but overpowering influence by public service officials. 
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Date:     9 March 2009 
                           
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Actors’ roles are fixed and not challenged    x  
New and diverse actors become involved as needs dictate  x    
Process is actively coordinated and facilitated  x    
 
The progressive change barometer      X                         
                               
Comments/observations: Although key relationships in the project are still largely ‘old’ relationships and there has been some change, as new actors have been brought 
into the process. Notwithstanding these changes, most project partners are resigned to their tasks in light of history rather than in light of needs and current capacity. 
Although there was an initial backlash from the traditional partners, there appears to be a slow recognition of the value of different knowledge stocks. 
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Domain: Role of different actors  
 
Date:      
                           
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Actors’ roles are fixed and not challenged      
New and diverse actors become involved as needs dictate      
Process is actively coordinated and facilitated      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                              set and fixed                                                   decided in consultation                                         iterative/evolving 
Comments/observations: 
 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Actors’ roles are fixed and not challenged      
New and diverse actors become involved as needs dictate      
Process is actively coordinated and facilitated      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Actors’ roles are fixed and not challenged      
New and diverse actors become involved as needs dictate      
Process is actively coordinated and facilitated      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Actors’ roles are fixed and not challenged      
New and diverse actors become involved as needs dictate      
Process is actively coordinated and facilitated      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Actors’ roles are fixed and not challenged      
New and diverse actors become involved as needs dictate      
Process is actively coordinated and facilitated      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Actors’ roles are fixed and not challenged      
New and diverse actors become involved as needs dictate      
Process is actively coordinated and facilitated      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Domain: Patterns of interaction 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions between a wide range of actors are frequent and efficient      
Linkages among actors are transparent, dynamic and evolving      
Responsibility for R&D process shared by wide range of actors      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                              Dominant member(s)                                                    joint implementation                                             joint responsibility 
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions between a wide range of actors are frequent and efficient      
Linkages among actors are transparent, respectful and evolving      
Responsibility for R&D process shared by wide range of actors      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
64 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions between a wide range of actors are frequent and efficient      
Linkages among actors are transparent, respectful and evolving      
Responsibility for R&D process shared by wide range of actors      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions between a wide range of actors are frequent and efficient      
Linkages among actors are transparent, respectful and evolving      
Responsibility for R&D process shared by wide range of actors      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions between a wide range of actors are frequent and efficient      
Linkages among actors are transparent, respectful and evolving      
Responsibility for R&D process shared by wide range of actors      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Existing mechanisms facilitate frequent interaction among a wide range of actors      
Linkages among actors are transparent, respectful and evolving      
Responsibility for R&D process shared by wide range of actors      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                           
Comments/observations: 
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Domain: Quality of interactions  
Date:      
                        
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions among actors are efficient and conducive to learning      
Processes draw on a wide variety of knowledge stocks      
Existing culture promotes sharing of experiences among actors       
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                              use of sanctions                   powers of veto                                                      consensus 
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                           
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions among actors are efficient and conducive to learning      
Processes draw on a wide variety of knowledge stocks      
Existing culture promotes sharing of experiences among actors       
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions among actors are efficient and conducive to learning      
Processes draw on a wide variety of knowledge stocks      
Existing culture promotes sharing of experiences among actors       
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                          
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions among actors are efficient and conducive to learning      
Processes draw on a wide variety of knowledge stocks      
Existing culture promotes sharing of experiences among actors       
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Date:      
                          
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions among actors are efficient and conducive to learning      
Processes draw on a wide variety of knowledge stocks      
Existing culture promotes sharing of experiences among actors       
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Interactions among actors are efficient and conducive to learning      
Processes draw on a wide variety of knowledge stocks      
Existing culture promotes sharing of experiences among actors       
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Domain: Enabling environment  
Date:      
                           
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Competencies and skills of sector actors are conducive to interaction      
Sector governance fosters participation, experimentation and learning      
Incentives that promote dialogues among sector actors are actively pursued      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                              negative environment                                                  neutral environment                                            positive environment 
Comments/observations: 
Date:      
                           
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Competencies and skills of sector actors are conducive to interaction      
Sector governance fosters participation, experimentation and learning      
Incentives that promote dialogues among sector actors are actively pursued      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Competencies and skills of sector actors are conducive to interaction      
Sector governance fosters participation, experimentation and learning      
Incentives that promote dialogues among sector actors are actively pursued      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Competencies and skills of sector actors are conducive to interaction      
Sector governance fosters participation, experimentation and learning      
Incentives that promote dialogues among sector actors are actively pursued      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Competencies and skills of sector actors are conducive to interaction      
Sector governance fosters participation, experimentation and learning      
Incentives that promote dialogues among sector actors are actively pursued      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
Competencies and skills of sector actors are conducive to interaction      
Sector governance fosters participation, experimentation and learning      
Incentives that promote dialogues among sector actors are actively pursued      
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Domain: Poverty relevance  
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
R&D processes ensure inclusion of the poor      
Poor (or their representatives) are actively involved in the processes      
Relevance of process to the poor actively assessed by different sources       
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                              output targets                                                     consulted stakeholders                                        coalition partners 
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
R&D processes ensure inclusion of the poor      
Poor (or their representatives) are actively involved in the processes      
Relevance of process to the poor actively assessed by different sources       
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
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Date:      
                            
Critical questions Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly agree  
R&D processes ensure inclusion of the poor      
Poor (or their representatives) are actively involved in the processes      
Relevance of process to the poor actively assessed by different sources       
 
The progressive change barometer                               
                             
Comments/observations: 
 
Date:      
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